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 In this dissertation, I investigate how experienced auditors recognize and respond to the 
degree of management’s evidentiary support and the level of estimate uncertainty when 
assessing management estimates.  Drawing on information processing research, I predict that 
auditors can be more comfortable with management estimates, and expect a lower adjustment 
when there is alignment between the degree of estimate uncertainty and management’s 
evidentiary support (i.e. high uncertainty and more support or lower uncertainty and less 
support).  I test my prediction using an experiment where experienced auditors evaluate an 
uncertain warranty estimate.  I manipulate the level of uncertainty by varying the range of 
potential costs as either two-times or eight-times materiality, and I manipulate the degree of 
management’s evidentiary support by management either obtaining industry information, 
inquiring of technicians, or doing these two plus reviewing records, and performing field 
inspections.  Results support my prediction; in the higher uncertainty condition auditors were 
more comfortable and expected a lower adjustment when management obtained more 
evidential support, but in the lower uncertainty condition auditors were more comfortable and 
expected a lower adjustment when management obtained less evidential support.  Notably I 
find that alignment between estimate uncertainty and management’s evidentiary support can 
make auditors more comfortable with management estimates supported by relatively less 
evidence.  These findings demonstrate how audit risk factors, such as the level of uncertainty 
and degree of management’s support can interact and cause auditors to more readily accept 
less supported financial statement estimates.  More broadly, these findings reveal how 
providing more information can actually make recipients more uncomfortable with a 
proposition.   
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 In this dissertation, I investigate how experienced auditors recognize and respond to 
the degree of management’s evidentiary support and the level of estimate uncertainty.  
Estimates are an integral part of financial statements (Peecher, Solomon, and Trotman 2013) 
and pose a challenge to auditors (Griffith, Hammersley, and Kadous 2013).  When auditing 
estimates, auditors often must rely on management’s subject matter expertise and other 
private information, which guides management’s selection of evidential support.  Auditing 
standards require that auditors critically examine management assumptions and ensure that 
management estimates are sufficiently supported.  The presumption in audit standards is that 
auditors will be more comfortable with better-supported management estimates.  Drawing on 
information processing research, I predict and find that auditors can be more comfortable 
with management estimates with less support because comfort is driven by alignment 
between the degree of estimate uncertainty and management’s evidentiary support (i.e. high 
uncertainty and more support or lower uncertainty and less support).  That is, alignment 
between estimate uncertainty and management’s support can occur when relatively less 
evidence supports some management estimates.  My findings extend theory on judgments 
under uncertainty and auditor judgment by demonstrating how audit risk factors interact to 
influence auditor comfort with management estimates, and the expected audit adjustment.  I 
also contribute to the auditor skepticism literature by demonstrating how subtle factors that 
are under the control of management can influence auditors’ expected adjustment to 
management estimates, and by showing the importance of skepticism of management’s 
selection of evidentiary support.  
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 Prior research has revealed that auditors sometimes are not sufficiently critical and use 
motivated reasoning in deciding whether to accept management accounting treatments (cf. 
Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Salterio and Koonce 1997; Kadous, Kennedy and Peecher 
2003; Ng and Tan 2003).  I examine a related but different phenomenon whereby alignment 
of risk factors undermines auditor tendency to systematically, versus heuristically, evaluate 
management’s accounting choices.  Importantly, I conjecture that alignment between 
estimate uncertainty and evidential support promotes auditor comfort, while misalignment 
diminishes auditor comfort, causing them to more critically evaluate the sufficiency of 
management’s evidential support.1  
 This dissertation uses the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) of information 
processing to support its predictions.  The HSM proposes that people use two fundamental 
modes of information processing, the systematic and the heuristic (Chaiken 1980; 
Zuckerman and Chaiken 1998).  The systematic processing mode is analytical and involves 
relatively high levels of data seeking, analysis, and integration.  The heuristic processing 
mode involves simplified decision rules that use less information, and more intuitive, 
automatic processing based on learned knowledge structures.  Importantly, individuals 
default to using heuristic processing unless motivated to use more effortful systematic 
processing. 
 In this dissertation, I investigate how estimate uncertainty and the degree of 
management’s evidentiary support endogenously motivate the auditor to process 
management’s assumptions systematically as opposed to heuristically.  Within my context, I 
predict that misalignment between the amount of uncertainty and the degree of 
                                                
1As discussed more fully in Chapter 2, auditor comfort can be thought of as auditor perception of the assurance 
provided over the financial statements. 
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management’s evidentiary support increases systematic processing, giving the auditor less 
comfort until they have performed sufficient appropriate audit procedures.  Alternatively, 
alignment between the amount of uncertainty and the degree of management’s evidentiary 
support provides no disconnect and gives the auditor more comfort earlier in the audit 
process, before the performance of substantial audit procedures.  Thus, I hypothesize that 
auditors are intrinsically less comfortable with extremely uncertain estimates when 
management has obtained little support, but also more comfortable with moderately 
uncertain estimates when management has obtained less support. 
 Using an experiment with experienced auditors, I examine auditor judgments early in 
the assessment of an uncertain warranty estimate.  Early audit judgments can affect 
subsequent evidence acquisition and evaluation; and in turn, auditors’ ultimate conclusions 
about the absence or presence of material misstatements and corresponding audit opinion.  I 
manipulate estimate uncertainty by adjusting the range of potential losses as either $2.5 
million (approximately two-times materiality) or $10.5 million (approximately eight-times 
materiality).2  I manipulate the degree of management’s evidential support as management 
basing their estimate on either industry information, inquiry of technicians, review of 
records, and field inspections; or only industry information, and inquiry of technicians. I 
measure the joint implications of these two factors on auditor comfort with management’s 
estimate and the effect on their expected adjustment.  After reading about a hypothetical 
company’s need for an adjustment to its warranty accrual, as is common in the industry, 
                                                
2 My operationalization of estimate uncertainty as the width of the estimate range is similar to Du and Budescu 
(2005), who varied the width of the range to manipulate “vague outcomes”.  As discussed more in Chapter 2, 
the uncertainty of an estimate with an undefined probability distribution is increasing in the width of the range 
of potential outcomes.  I leave the probability distribution undefined because generally accepted accounting 
principles dictate the estimate once the probability distribution is known (as either the low end, or the most 
likely point within the range). 
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participants receive industry information that reveals an estimate range (Moderate or 
Extreme).  They then receive management’s analysis, which comprises the degree of 
evidential support (More or Less) and management’s final warranty estimate (held constant 
across conditions).  Participants then evaluate the reasonableness of, and comfort with, 
management’s estimate; provide their expected financial statement adjustment; and respond 
to other related questions. 
 Results are consistent with my predictions.  The degree of management’s evidentiary 
support has an opposite directional impact on auditor comfort under relatively moderate 
versus extreme uncertainty.  I find that under moderate uncertainty, auditors are more 
comfortable with management’s estimate when management provided less supporting 
evidence.  However, under extreme uncertainty auditors, more conventionally, are more 
comfortable with management’s estimate when management provides more supporting 
evidence.  I also find that auditor comfort mediates their expected adjustment to the financial 
statements, providing a link between auditor comfort and the financial statement estimate.  
In supplemental analysis I find a similar interaction effect between estimate uncertainty and 
evidential support on auditor perception of the level of assurance provided to users of the 
financial statements.  To support my theory that lack of auditor systematic reasoning is 
driving my results, and not other implications of misalignment, I examine participants’ 
responses to several follow-up questions.  Participant responses reveal that my predicted 
interaction is driven by the level of systematic information processing and not by 
perceptions of management competence or by management’s evidentiary support indicating 
a different level of uncertainty than implied by the uncertainty manipulation. 
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 This dissertation extends theory on auditor judgments under uncertainty by 
demonstrating that uncertainty aversion and the typical understanding of audit risk factors 
does not fully explain auditor judgments regarding management’s estimate.  With this better 
understanding of how auditors combine audit risks to make judgments regarding estimate 
uncertainty, future research can explore similar potential hazards to auditor judgments and 
mechanisms to mediate these hazards.  For instance, misalignment may occur due to poor 
calibration of management regarding auditors desired level of evidence, or management 
could strategically control the level of support to manipulate auditor comfort and financial 
statement adjustments. 
 My dissertation both differs from and complements earlier research on auditor risk 
evaluation by showing how very subtle misalignment between auditor expectations and 
evidence can enhance auditor comfort.  Earlier studies generally predict and find that 
increases in audit risk factors, such as management’s incentives to misstate (Glover, 
Jiambalvo and Kennedy 2000), client integrity (Peecher 1996), or heightened engagement 
risk (Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996) decrease auditor comfort.  Alternatively, my theory and 
findings demonstrate that auditor comfort is not strictly increasing with increases in 
management’s evidentiary support.  These findings reflect the subtleties of combining risk 
factors, such as the level of uncertainty and degree of management’s evidential support, 
when auditing accounting estimates.  I also extend Griffith et al. (2013), by examining 
factors that contribute to auditors’ comfort with management estimates.  Across my 
experimental conditions, for example, auditors’ average levels of comfort leads them to 
classify identical management estimates as reasonable versus unreasonable.  Understanding 
how auditors combine risk factors and naturally become comfortable with estimates, 
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depending on the alignment of evidential support and uncertainty, may help regulators who 
design standards intended to promote audit quality.  Without such understanding, regulators 
are unlikely to contemplate that auditors may be more comfortable with less management 
evidential support for some estimates, or that their own critiques about auditor judgment 
quality could be motivated by the misalignment between uncertainty and the degree of audit 
evidence.  
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows.  In Chapter 2, I discuss 
related research and theory, and further develop my hypotheses. In Chapter 3, I summarize 
my experiment and participants.  In Chapter 4, I present the results of my experiment along 
with supplemental analysis.  Lastly, in Chapter 5, I conclude the dissertation and present 
areas for future research. 
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2. Literature Review and Theory Development 
2.1 Auditing Estimates 
 Accounting estimates are an integral part of financial statements, and they give 
management the ability to provide private information to the market pertaining to future 
resolutions of current period uncertainties.  Estimates with high or extreme uncertainty are 
frequently more subjective because they afford more discretion in the selection and 
interpretation of inputs. Thus, auditing the reasonableness of management estimates under 
extreme uncertainty is difficult and requires extensive professional judgment (Peecher, et al. 
2013; Christensen, Glover and Wood 2012).  Difficulty gathering and applying evidence for 
highly uncertain estimates inevitably causes differences in professional judgment (Bell and 
Griffin 2012), as revealed by publicly disclosed portions of PCAOB inspection reports (e.g. 
PCAOB 2008).  Despite the importance of accounting estimates and the difficulty inherent 
in auditing them, we know relatively little about how auditors become comfortable with 
management estimates (Griffith et al. 2013). 
 Auditors are required to plan and perform an audit to gain comfort that the financial 
statements are free of material misstatement.  Within the context of accounting estimates, 
auditor comfort consists of factors such as the reasonableness of management’s estimate, 
verifiability of the estimate, and potential management bias.3  Importantly, comfort captures 
the subjective nature of assessing the sufficiency and appropriateness of evidence used to 
support an estimate that is inherently uncertain.  Auditor comfort pertaining to estimates is 
                                                
3 As discussed more fully in the next section, I conceptualize the audit as a series of comfort producing 
activities that are summarized into overall comfort that the financial statement are not materially misstated, and 
then passed on to end users of the financial statements (Pentland 1993; Pomeroy 2013; Carrington and Catasús 
2007).  This notion is consistent with personal experience in audit practice, discussions with practicing 
auditors, review of firm specific materials, and audit procedures providing subjective support for the auditor to 
proceed and eventually issue an audit opinion, in contrast to audit procedures providing objective proof that the 
financials are not misstated. 
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unique from other financial statement items because there is inherent uncertainty (i.e. 
unknown outcome) in addition to audit uncertainty (i.e. detection risk) (cf. Bell and Griffin 
2012).  Therefore, an estimate could be materially correct and also be materially different 
from the final (unknown) settlement amount.  Auditors are responsible for determining the 
reasonableness of management estimates given the evidence available at the time the 
estimate is made, which can increase the influence management’s evidential support has on 
auditor judgments. 
 Auditing accounting estimates involves some combination of (1) evaluating 
management’s process to develop the estimate; (2) developing an independent expectation to 
corroborate management’s estimate; and (3) reviewing subsequent events (PCAOB 2010a).  
The auditor performs these procedures to arrive at a range of reasonable values to help judge 
the reasonableness of management’s estimate.  Auditors are required to opine on the 
reasonableness of management estimates, despite the underlying verifiability or uncertainty 
of the estimate (Martin, Rich and Wilks 2006). An extensive body of research has examined 
auditor judgment pertaining to estimates; however, much of this research utilizes the 
subjectivity of estimates to study the effects of auditor incentives, prior beliefs, or judgment 
errors, as opposed to looking at the impact of the estimate itself (Griffith et al. 2013).    
 Environmental factors and practical limitations often restrict the degree of evidential 
support available to auditors, making it difficult, in some circumstances, to determine what 
constitutes sufficient appropriate evidence.  The conventional presumption in auditing 
standards and most audit research is that greater evidentiary support reduces uncertainty and 
thus auditor reasonableness assessments should increase when greater evidence is available 
to support the estimate (c.f. Budescu, Peecher and Solomon 2012; PCAOB 2010b; Elder and 
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Allen 2003; Mock and Wright 1993; and 1999).  However, the determination of what 
constitutes sufficient, appropriate evidence when auditing an uncertain estimate is 
subjective, and likely influenced by various contextual features.  Gathering sufficient, 
appropriate evidence is a growing issue in auditing, due in part to the increased use of fair 
values (Bell and Griffin 2012; Christensen et al. 2012; Bratten et al. 2012). Christensen et al. 
(2012), for example, discuss a sensitivity analysis provided in Wells Fargo’s 2008 financial 
statements and illustrate that a 200 basis point range (not unreasonable in that environment) 
would yield an adjustment to the financial statements fifty four times materiality, and it 
would only take a 3.7 basis point change to reach materiality.  Auditors face the challenge of 
determining what constitutes sufficient appropriate evidence in light of such extreme 
uncertainty. 
 According to auditing standards, the risk of misstatement of an estimate is a 
combination of the “complexity and subjectivity associated with the process, the availability 
and reliability of relevant data, the number and significance of assumptions that are made, 
and the degree of uncertainty associated with the assumptions.” (AU Section 342.05, 
Auditing Accounting Estimates (AICPA 1988)).  Thus, in the early phases of the audit, 
auditor comfort should reflect these factors.  However, auditing standards seem to imply that 
these risk factors are additive and do not interact with each other in any meaningful way.  
Alternatively, I predict that some of these factors interact with each other to influence 
overall auditor comfort with management estimate.  Principally, I predict and find that the 
degree of uncertainty and level of management support (significant management assumption 
regarding the availability and reliability of relevant data) interact to make auditors more 
comfortable when management has less support. 
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2.2 Auditor Comfort 
 Comfort, used as my primary variable of interest, reflects the inherent uncertainty 
within auditing and the terminology of practicing auditors (Pentland 1993; Carrington and 
Catasús 2007).  The term, auditor comfort, was highlighted at least as early as Pentland 
(1993), who discusses auditing tasks as rituals providing comfort to the auditor who then 
provides comfort to financial statement users.  In a later study, Carrington and Catasús 
(2007) discuss comfort from three dimensions, comfort as a state, comfort as relief, and 
comfort as renewal.  The main thrust of this literature, and the use of the term comfort, is to 
emphasize the subjective nature of providing assurance, most notably the notion that 
assurance is not merely an objective evaluation of evidence but a ritual that produces 
comfort.  Comfort captures the subjectivity of providing an opinion on financial statements 
that contain inherently uncertain estimates, based on partial examination of the underlying 
support.  Put another way, comfort reflects quality, not just acceptability of financial 
statement amounts.  Comfort highlights the fact that audits are not purely statistical exercises 
that produce objective proof, but a series of activities that provide a subjective belief that the 
financial statements are reliable.   
 Although comfort as a measure of auditors’ willingness to accept management 
assumptions is new to experimental researchers, prior research has documented auditor use 
of the term in practice to refer to extent to which a risk of misstatement is acceptable 
(Pentland 1993; Carrington and Catasús 2007; Hurtt 2010).  Comfort has been used to 
describe the extent to which auditors are willing to accept management assertions in audit 
firm releases (PWC 2012; Ernst & Young 2006; KPMG 2011; Bell et al. 2005), and in 
academic research (Biggs et al. 1988; Martin et al. 2006; Pomeroy 2013).  For example, 
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KPMG (2011, 10) states that a question one might ask when trying to identify objectives is, 
“are you comfortable at a ‘gut level’ moving ahead with the judgment process?”  The term 
comfort also arises in practice relating to auditor letters for underwriters that provide varying 
levels of assurance over financial statements and other firm data for interim periods (AU 
Section 634, Letters for Underwriters and Certain Other Requesting Parties (AICPA 1998), 
and which are referred to in practice as “Comfort Letters” (Resnick 1979).  Even outside of 
accounting, researchers routinely use the term comfort to describe the extent to which a risk 
is acceptable to an individual (Tetlock and Boettger 1994; Chow and Sarin 2002, Dowling 
Staelin 1994; Gurmankin et al. 2004). 
 Comfort captures the notion that auditor assurance over financial statements extends 
beyond just the acceptability of management’s accounting.  Auditing standards on estimates 
generally limit auditor responsibility to assessing reasonableness; however, standards on 
required auditor communications to the audit committee highlight the notion that assurance 
is more than just reasonableness.  Standards require auditors to communicate to the audit 
committee not just the appropriateness of management estimates but also the quality of those 
estimates (PCAOB 2012).  Although the PCAOB focuses its discussion of quality on 
potential management bias, earlier auditing standards (AU Section 380, The Auditor’s 
Communication With Those Charged With Governance (AICPA 2006)) highlight potential 
quality factors as those that may influence representational faithfulness, verifiability, and 
neutrality. Similarly, the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999), in its recommendation that 
auditors discuss the quality of a company’s accounting highlighted quality factors such as 
clarity of financial disclosures and aggressiveness.  Notably, earlier standards recognized 
that “Objective criteria have not been developed to aid in the consistent evaluation of the 
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quality of an entity’s accounting principles as applied to its financial statements” (AU 
Section 380.11 (AICPA 2006)). Thus, audit standards have long recognized that providing 
assurance extends beyond simply assessing the appropriateness or reasonableness of an 
estimate to more subjective evaluations of quality.  Auditor comfort captures estimate 
reasonableness and more subjective factors inherent in providing assurance.  Studying 
comfort will help auditors, regulators, and researchers understand some of the factors 
contributing to the level of assurance, for which objective criteria do not exist. 
 I use auditor comfort to examine key interactions of inputs into the judgment process 
(i.e. uncertainty and management support) because it capture the subjectivity of the audit 
process and is a primary measure used by auditors in practice to make many audit judgments 
(Pentland 1993).  Prior research examining auditor judgment under uncertainty frequently 
focuses on outcome measures such as whether to require disclosure (e.g. Nelson and Kinney 
1997; Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Jenkins and Haynes 2003), or the likelihood and 
amount of an adjustment (e.g. Haynes et al. 1998; Griffin 2011; Braun 2001; Libby and 
Kinney 2000; Nelson et al. 2005).  By focusing on the comfort, as opposed to outcome 
measures alone, I am better able to differentiate the cognitive driver of the audit outcome, 
which helps to understand auditor judgment processes.  My approach is similar to some 
other studies that focus on auditor judgment processes, and use measures encompassed by 
comfort (e.g. Kadous et al. (2003) use acceptability, and Earley (2002) uses reasonableness).  
As discussed earlier, comfort captures both the acceptability and reasonableness of 
management’s estimate as well as more subjective factors that are less understood.  By 
examining the interactive affects of estimate uncertainty and management support on auditor 
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comfort, I capture a key auditor judgment that can affect many areas of the audit, including 
the expected adjustment (which I also measure). 
 Overall, auditor comfort is a robust construct used extensively in practice to represent 
the level of assurance that auditors believe they are providing over the financial statements.  
Thus, comfort is a useful measure of auditor judgments in this context, because it captures 
the subjective nature of auditor evidence evaluation in a manner familiar to the auditor while 
providing a meaningful measure of their cognitive process. 
2.3 Auditor Skepticism 
 I examine how the interaction between estimate uncertainty and management 
evidentiary support interact to increase auditor comfort.  Importantly, I conjecture that 
auditors will be more comfortable unless misalignment between estimate uncertainty and 
evidential support motivates auditors to process information more systematically.  Auditor 
comfort is also related to auditor skepticism.  Auditor comfort with management’s estimate 
reflects the extent to which they suspend judgment on management’s assertion; suspension 
of judgment is a key dimension of auditor skepticism (Hurtt 2010).  Additionally, increased 
comfort decreases the likelihood that auditors will reach judgments and decisions that 
“reflect a heightened assessment of the risk that an assertion is incorrect” (Nelson 2009, p. 
4).  Furthermore, my theoretical prediction and finding that auditors are naturally more 
comfortable with less evidentiary support under moderate uncertainty would generally be 
considered to run counter to various perspectives in the literature on auditor professional 
skepticism, whether it is neutral, presumptive doubt, or Bayesian diagnosticity (Bamber, 
Ramsay and Tubbs 1997; Nelson 2009; Hurtt 2010).  This dissertation contributes to the 
literature on auditor skepticism by illustrating how alignment of uncertainty and 
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management support increases auditor comfort and decreases skepticism, earlier in the audit 
process. 
2.4 Uncertainty Aversion 
 Research in psychology, economics, and accounting demonstrates that individuals 
have a strong aversion to uncertainty, which is broadly defined as a recognized lack of 
knowledge (Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Frisch and Baron 1988; Keren and Gerritsen 
1999; Morrison 2002).4  Within the area of accounting and auditing, Nelson et al. (2005) 
demonstrate that auditors are averse to uncertainty by showing that they are more likely to 
require adjustment of a misstatement presented as a range than a misstatement presented as a 
point.  Additionally, auditors are more conservative under higher risk and uncertainty 
(Kinney and Martin 1994; Hirst 1994; Barron, Pratt and Stice 2001; Smith and Kida 1991), 
and uncertainty has been shown to increase auditors’ risk assessments leading to increased 
sampling rates (Zimbelman and Waller 1999; Taylor 2000).   
 Griffin (2011) evaluates the precision and subjectivity of fair value estimates on 
auditor judgments and finds that auditors are more inclined to require adjustments when fair 
values are imprecise and subjective, an effect that is moderated when management chooses 
to disclose the uncertainty in the financial statements.  Other studies in accounting have 
demonstrated that uncertainty decreases audit committee support for auditor adjustments 
(DeZoort, Hermanson and Houston 2003) and worsens earnings quality (based on a review 
                                                
4 I am principally concerned with outcome uncertainty and do not test or discuss uncertainty about the shape of 
the underlying probability distribution (frequently referred to as probability uncertainty, vagueness, 
imprecision or ambiguity (c.f. Kuhn and Budescu 1996)).  While probability uncertainty is frequently 
encountered in auditing (Nelson and Kinney 1997; Zimbelman and Waller 1999), I do not actively manipulate 
probability uncertainty as that would dictate the appropriate accounting treatment under FASB Interpretation 
No. 14, Reasonable Estimation of the Amount of a Loss an interpretation of FASB Statement No. 5 (FIN 14) 
(FASB 1976).  Additionally, prior research has indicated that individuals are more concerned with outcome 
uncertainty than probability uncertainty (Du and Budescu 2005). 
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of archival studies on earnings quality) (Francis, Olsson and Schipper 2006).  I therefore 
anticipate that auditors in my experiment will be more comfortable with less uncertain 
estimates than with more uncertain estimates (i.e. a main effect of uncertainty).   
 I contribute to the uncertainty aversion research by predicting that uncertainty aversion 
alone does not explain auditor judgments related to estimates well.  Instead, auditors’ 
reasoning process about uncertainty surrounding estimates is regulated by natural triggers or 
suppressors that mediate their comfort.  
2.5 Natural Triggers and Suppressors of Auditor Comfort 
 The Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) of information processing is a dual-process 
model that distinguishes between judgments made systematically and those made 
heuristically.5  Heuristic processing requires less effort and involves using learned 
knowledge structures regarding cues instead of detailed evaluation of individual aspects of 
information.  Heuristic processing is considered the default individual preference for making 
decisions and only requires that a heuristic is available, accessible and applicable (Chen, 
Duckworth and Chaiken 1999; Higgins 1996).  Broadly defined, systematic processing 
involves more complex, effortful thinking regarding data seeking, analysis, and integration 
of information.  In order to engage in systematic processing one must have the cognitive 
ability and motivation to do so.  The motivation to perform systematic processing (as 
opposed to heuristic processing) is driven by the difference between an individual’s actual 
level of comfort and their desired level of comfort; the greater the difference the greater the 
motivation to perform systematic processing (Chen et al. 1999).  The HSM is particularly 
                                                
5 The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM) (Petty and Cacioppo 1986) proposes similar modes and would 
generally yield similar predictions.  I use the HSM to theoretically support my predictions because its concept 
of heuristics is a bit broader than ELM’s ‘peripheral cues’ and simplifies my exposition. 
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relevant to the auditing setting where auditors are required to gather sufficient, appropriate 
evidence to reach a desired level of comfort regarding the accuracy of the financial 
statements. 
 Prior research and regulatory inspections suggest that auditors frequently over-rely on 
management assertions, and are not sufficiently skeptical.  PCAOB inspection reports claim 
that auditors sometimes fail to adequately question management assumptions (PCAOB 
2011a; PCAOB 2011b; PCAOB 2008). Further, recent research (Griffith et al. 2013) 
documents that auditors rely heavily on management’s estimate-generating process rather 
than independently developing expectations.  Past research has documented instances where 
auditors are more inclined to support management’s accounting when standards are unclear 
(Hackenbrack and Nelson 1996; Salterio and Koonce 1997; Kadous et al. 2003; Ng and Tan 
2003), or the auditor has a weaker understanding of the environment (Brewster 2009).   
 Given prior research on auditor judgment, I contend that auditors are often not inclined 
to systematically evaluate management’s assumptions but instead are inclined to accept and 
be relatively comfortable with management’s accounting, unless some trigger causes them to 
question management’s assumptions.  Absence of a trigger leads to heuristic processing, 
which subtly affects the mindset of the auditor, making them less critical with regard to the 
procedures performed and evidence evaluated.  Heuristic processing will reduce auditor 
vigilance in assessing the reasonableness of management’s estimates, and will make them 
apt to think that the most appropriate amount to record in the financial statements is 
relatively close to management’s preferred amount.  Therefore, I contend that auditors do 
not systematically process information unless triggers exist that motivate them to do so.  In 
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the auditing context, misalignment between the degree of management evidentiary support 
and uncertainty surrounding an estimate could provide the necessary trigger. 
 Literature in communication also has examined the implications of misalignment 
between the quantity of information provided and the quantity anticipated, and found that 
misalignment increased skepticism regarding the assertions presented.  Grice developed 
norms or maxims of communication that help people understand each other, one of which 
was the quantity maxim (1975).  The quantity maxim states that in communication one 
should provide only that information which is required; too little information leads to 
ambiguity and excess information causes confusion as the recipient tries to interpret it in 
light of the situation.  Both of these misalignment conditions increase the recipient’s focus 
on the information and decrease their focus on the communication, leading to more 
systematic processing of the information.  In line with this notion, prior research has found 
that overzealous communication by companies decreases legitimacy by increasing 
constituent skepticism (Ashforth and Gibbs 1990). 
 The forgoing discussion suggests the following role of alignment (see Figure 1).  
Figure 1, Panel A depicts a graphical representation of my context.  The x-axis represents the 
level of uncertainty and the y-axis represents the degree of management’s evidential support.  
The diagonal dotted line represents the auditor’s expectation; as estimate uncertainty 
increases, the auditor expects higher degrees of evidential support. The upper solid line and 
lower dashed line represent more and less evidential support provided by management, 
respectively.  Figure 1, Panel B depicts a graphical representation of my theoretical 
predictions.  My theory predicts that points along the auditor’s expectation line elicit less 
systematic processing than points not on the expectation line.  The diamonds represent the 
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points where management’s evidentiary support and auditor expectations for support, given 
the level of uncertainty, are aligned.  The square represents misalignment by seemingly ‘too 
much’ evidential support given the level of estimate uncertainty; whereas, the circle 
represents misalignment by seemingly ‘too little’ evidential support.  The arrows between 
the diamonds and the square or circle (depending on condition) represent the extent of 
misalignment, and thus the extent of auditor discomfort. 
2.6 Hypotheses 
 Based on the HSM and Grice’s communication norms, I predict that auditors will 
naturally be more comfortable with management estimates when there is alignment between 
the degree of management’s evidentiary support and the level of estimate uncertainty.  
Specifically, I hypothesize that when management has less support for an extremely 
uncertain estimate, auditors are less comfortable.  More troubling, however, when 
management has less support for a moderately uncertain estimate, I predict auditors to be 
more comfortable with management’s estimate.  This discussion leads to my formal 
hypotheses regarding auditor judgment.  
 H1: Under moderate uncertainty, auditors are relatively more (less) comfortable with 
management’s estimate when management provides less (more) evidential 
support; but under extreme uncertainty, auditors are relatively less (more) 
comfortable with management’s estimate when management provides less (more) 
evidential support. 
 I further predict that auditor comfort will directly effect auditor’s expectation of the 
most likely adjustment to management’s financial statements.  This prediction provides a 
link between auditor’s skeptical judgments and their anticipated skeptical actions (cf. Nelson 
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2009; Shaub and Lawrence 1996).  I predict that judgment will translate into action because 
the auditor can focus their questions on the estimate uncertainty; thus, the auditor can avoid 
the face-to-face confrontation of management that Shaub and Lawrence (1996) indicate 
causes a disconnect between skeptical judgment and action.6  When auditors are more 
comfortable with management’s estimate, they will anticipate a lower adjustment to the 
financial statements; however, when auditors are less comfortable with management’s 
estimate they will anticipate a higher adjustment to the financial statements.  Thus, I predict 
that auditor comfort will mediate auditor perception of the most likely adjustment to the 
financial statements.  Formally stated: 
 H2: Auditors' comfort with management's estimate mediates their expected 
adjustment to the financial statements. 
 Taken together, I hypothesize that auditor evaluation of management’s estimate will 
be influenced by the alignment between the level of uncertainty and the degree of 
management’s evidentiary support.  These hypotheses imply a disordinal interaction 
between uncertainty and support.  
                                                
6 Nelson (2009) identifies factors that can influence the extent that skeptical judgment leads to skeptical action, 
including incentives, traits, knowledge, and audit experience and training.  Ex-ante there is no reason to expect 
that any of these factors will inhibit auditor judgment translating into action in my context. 
20 
3. Method 
 I test my predictions using a 2x2 between-subjects, experimental design with 
experienced auditors.  The experimental method provides sufficient control over the context 
to distinguish between the effect of the level of uncertainty and degree of management 
evidentiary support even though these factors may correlate in practice.  An experiment also 
helps control for other environmental factors.  I use experienced auditors for four specific 
reasons.  First, one could argue that auditors are trained in the financial statement 
implications of audit risks and specifically trained to be critical of management assertions.  
Thus, findings from an experiment using non-auditor participants may not generalize to 
auditors.  Secondly, my predictions rely on auditors using learned knowledge structures to 
recognize conditions of alignment and misalignment.  Participants with little or no audit 
experience would not be able to recognize alignment and misalignment and thus my 
predictions would not manifest.  Third, using a context where experienced auditors make 
familiar audit related judgments helps address the concern that familiarity (or leaning over 
time) would nullify my findings.  Lastly, the term ‘comfort’ is everyday language to auditors 
and their job revolves around gaining comfort with uncertainty.  Overall, an experiment with 
experienced auditors provides the necessary contextual control and participants to 
appropriately test my hypotheses. 
 I examine auditor judgments in the early (risk assessment) phase of an audit of an 
uncertain warranty estimate.  I manipulate estimate uncertainty by varying the range of 
potential outcomes (Extreme vs. Moderate) and management’s evidentiary support by 
varying the number of types of support utilized (More vs. Less).  Participants are introduced 
to the company, read a brief background and update on the current year audit, and are made 
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aware of an industry wide issue that will affect the current year warranty accrual.  
Participants then receive more detailed industry information along with management’s 
analysis and adjustment to the warranty accrual and assess the reasonableness of 
management’s adjustment to the current year accrual.7  See Appendix A for the experimental 
materials. 
3.1 Participants 
 Audit seniors from a Big Four firm (n=95) completed the experimental task at a 
national training session for experienced senior associates, sponsored by the firm. 
Participants had mean (standard deviation) audit experience of 3.6 years (1.1 years) ranging 
from 2 to 8 years, and 2.6 years of public company audit experience.  Participants took an 
average of 27 minutes to complete the task.   
 I exclude from my primary analyses data from seven auditors who failed to complete 
all necessary portions of the experiment, and one auditor who demonstrated inattentiveness 
to the experiment by responding with the same point on twenty consecutive scale questions.8  
After these exclusions, there were eighty-seven usable participant responses.  Participants 
indicated they were familiar with the accounting for estimates (6.2 on an 11-point scale with 
                                                
7 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 5 (SFAS 5), Accounting for Contingencies, requires that a 
contingent liability be recorded only when a loss is both probable and reasonably estimable (FASB 1975).  
Based on discussions with practicing auditors, and personal experience as an audit manager, it is extremely 
unusual that a loss be probable and not presumed to also be reasonably estimable.  This application of the 
standard leads to estimates for liabilities that are probable (or even certain) but where the amount is highly 
uncertain and minimally supported.  Within the warranty loss situation that I examine, no auditor that I 
consulted with in preparation of the instrument indicated that the estimate was not estimable and that nothing 
should be recorded; however, three participants responded with either very low or no adjustment, which 
indicates that they believed the estimate was likely not reasonably estimable.  These three participants are 
discussed more fully in the results section. 
8 To identify inattentive participants I performed a response pattern test by identifying the longest string of 
consecutive responses by each participant (Meade and Craig 2012; Johnson 2005).  Based on the results of this 
test I dropped one inattentive participant who responded with the same point on the scale for twenty 
consecutive scale questions, the next longest string was five.  Results for auditor comfort for all participants is 
reported in Table 4, and shows that my results are not sensitive to my participant selection criteria. 
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0 being not familiar and 10 being very familiar) and participated in discussions with 
management (6.8 on an 11-point scale with 0 being never and 10 being very often). 
3.2 Experimental Task 
 The hypothetical company, Advanced Network Services (ANS) sells and installs 
computer network equipment and provides warranty and servicing under fixed rate contracts 
to its customers.9    Last year the company began installing technologically advanced routers, 
and management recently discovered that many of the installations were faulty, causing 
higher than average warranty repair costs.  Most companies in the industry also adopted the 
new routers and were having similar installation and warranty estimation issues.  ANS 
gathers industry information to develop an initial range of costs and gathers internal 
evidence that further supports their estimate.  In all cases, management estimates the same 
‘most appropriate’ adjustment based on the midpoint of the inputs initially identified across 
the industry. 
Independent Variables 
 I manipulate degree of management support and level of estimate uncertainty between 
subjects.  In the More support condition, management bases their estimate on industry 
information, inquiry of installation technicians, review of installation records and field 
inspections.  In the Less evidence condition, management bases their estimate only on 
industry information and inquiry of installation technicians.10  I designed the task to provide 
a clean manipulation of management’s evidentiary support for the estimate while ensuring 
that my moderate uncertainty/less support condition was considered aligned.  I ensured 
                                                
9 The experimental task is novel to this research project but was motivated by warranty reserve issues 
experienced by Microsoft on its XBox gaming console. 
10 Under SFAS 5, basing a warranty accrual on other companies in the same business is appropriate when the 
company has no experience of its own (FASB 1975). 
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alignment of this condition by discussing the manipulation with practicing auditors, recalling 
my own audit experience, using an estimate task where audit procedures are not dictated by 
standards or practice, and by having other companies in the industry rely primarily on 
inquiry of installation technicians.   
 I manipulate estimate uncertainty as the industry’s range of potential costs associated 
with repairing the faulty installations (Extreme or Moderate).  In the Moderate condition, the 
range of potential costs is $2.5 million (two times materiality) and in the Extreme condition, 
it is $10.5 million (eight times materiality).11  In all conditions participants were informed 
that “... the necessary adjustment to the warranty accrual is almost certainly in excess of 
quantitative materiality of $1.3 million that was set during audit planning”.12  See Appendix 
A, Section 2 for the Extreme uncertainty and Less evidential support condition, and Section 
3 for the Moderate uncertainty and More evidential support condition (the two misaligned 
conditions). 
Dependent Variables 
 After reviewing this information, participants respond to a set of questions about the 
warranty issue and the audit (see Appendix A, Section 4).  I ask two questions designed to 
capture the auditors’ comfort with management’s warranty accrual.  The two questions are 
(1) “Rate the overall reasonableness of management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the 
warranty accrual?” (-5=Not at All Reasonable, 0=Just Meets Reasonableness Threshold, 
                                                
11 I chose ranges for this dissertation to ensure that participants would not perceive the adjustment as 
insignificant, while providing a strong enough manipulation to give the theory the best chase of manifesting.  
The range as a multiple of materiality (two, and eight times materiality) is also consistent with the mean 
aggregate audit adjustments reported in earlier studies (Kinney and Martin 1994). 
12 In both of my uncertainty conditions the probability that the range is greater than materiality is very high.  
For instance in the moderate uncertainty condition; if participants perceive a normal distribution with the range 
as a ninety-five percent confidence interval there is a thirty-two percent chance the range is greater than 
materiality.  Likewise, if participants perceive a uniform distribution within the range there is a fifty percent 
chance the range is greater than materiality. 
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5=Very Reasonable), and (2) “How comfortable are you with management’s adjustment to 
the warranty accrual?”(-5=Very Uncomfortable, 0=As Comfortable As Not, 5=Very 
Comfortable).  I also ask questions designed to measure the participants’ perception of the 
evidence, management’s analysis, and the level of assurance provided to users.  In addition 
to these measures, I ask participants to determine their own best estimate, reasonable range 
of adjustments, and lastly the amount they “believe will most likely be recorded in the 
financial statements” (expected adjustment).  My primary dependent variables are (1) a 
composite measure taking the average of the reasonableness of the adjustment and the 
auditor’s comfort with the adjustment, and (2) the expected adjustment to the financial 
statements, on top of management’s estimate.  Following the dependent measures, 
participants respond to a series of process measures, complete a short within-subjects task, 
answer manipulation checks (Appendix A, Section 5), and complete demographic questions 
(Appendix A, Section 6).  I discuss each variable collected in the experiment; and tabulate 
and discuss the results of each variable in Appendix B.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Manipulation and Context Checks 
 The experimental context was designed such that participants would generally be less 
comfortable with lower adjustments to the warranty accrual (conservatism).  My prediction 
in H2 relies on participants being less comfortable with lower adjustments and this 
relationship will not hold (or be reversed) if participants believe that management’s 
adjustment is too high.  Given the importance of participants not perceiving management’s 
estimate as too high (too conservative), I exclude three participants who entered adjustment 
amounts far below management’s estimate (i.e. participants that think management is 
understating income).13  As reported in Table 4, Panel B, Column E, the inclusion of these 
observations strengthens my results for auditor comfort (H1) (F(1,83) = 8.45; pone-tailed < 
0.01).  As one would expect, however, the mediating affect of auditor comfort on expected 
adjustment (H2) is no longer significant (Step 3 of Barron and Kenny (1986), t(82) = -1.06; 
ptwo-tailed = 0.29), although the interaction effect on the expected adjustment (Step 1), remain 
marginally significant (F(1,83) = -1.47; pone-tailed = 0.07).14   The elimination of these 
participants results in a final sample size of eighty-four usable participants.  
 Participants were asked to identify the range of potential costs presented in the 
industry information and ninety-three percent answered consistent with their condition.  
                                                
13 These participants responded to the context very differently than I planed and very differently than all other 
participants.  Results that include a small set of influential outliers can cause either Type I or Type II errors by 
reporting results that reflect the outliers while appearing to reflect all the observations (Judd et al. 1995).  A 
scatter plot of the residual terms against the predicted values and Cook’s distance revealed that these three 
observations were outliers and very influential in analysis of the expected adjustment to the financial 
statements.  These three observations have studentized residuals in excess of three, and Cook’s distances more 
than three times that of the next most influential observation. The three outliers were all in the Extreme 
condition, with one in the More and two in the Less support conditions. 
14 Controlling for the outliers provides similar results to those reported (H1 (F(1,86) = 8.00; pone-tailed < 0.01; H2 
step 3 t(86) = -2.33; ptwo-tailed = 0.02, step 4 t(86) = -1.70; ptwo-tailed = 0.09), as does reverse coding outliers (H1 
(F(1,86) = 6.46; pone-tailed < 0.01; H2 step 3 t(86) = -3.72; ptwo-tailed < 0.01, step 4 t(86) = -0.63; ptwo-tailed = 0.53).  
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Participants were also asked which pieces of information were accumulated and analyzed by 
management and eighty percent answered consistent with their condition.  The lower correct 
response rate in the management support conditions is partially due to the support in the Less 
condition being a subset of the support in the More condition, and participants only checking 
off the one piece of support that was present in all conditions (which was also the first option 
in the manipulation check question); adjusting for this increases the correct response rate to 
eighty-seven percent.  Eliminating participants who failed at least one of the manipulation 
checks does not significantly affect my results.  In addition to the direct question regarding 
support, I also asked participants “how much evidence is available to support the warranty 
accrual adjustment” (0=minimal evidence, 5=average evidence, 10=extensive evidence).  
Consistent with my manipulation, participants indicated that there was more support in the 
More condition (mean = 4.4) than the Less condition (mean = 3.0) (F(1,80) = 13.91; ptwo-tailed 
< 0.01).15  These high rates indicate that both manipulations were successful. 
 In follow-up questions, I asked participants a series of questions related to the case and 
management. To ensure that participants evaluated the warranty adjustment as material, I 
asked participants how likely “is the warranty accrual adjustment decision material to ANS’s 
financial statements?”  Participants believed the adjustment was material (0=Not Very 
Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very Likely; mean=8.2), and there was no significant 
difference in materiality evaluations between conditions (i.e. all ptwo-tailed  0.34).  Although 
participants viewed the warranty accrual decision as equally material across conditions, 
participants in the Extreme uncertainty condition evaluated the risk of material misstatement 
                                                
15 This holds for both levels of estimate uncertainty (moderate, F(1,42) = 6.36; ptwo-tailed = 0.02; extreme, 
F(1,38) = 7.45; ptwo-tailed = 0.01). 
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as significantly higher (mean = 8.1) than those in the Moderate uncertainty condition (mean 
= 7.5) (F(1,82) = 3.22; ptwo-tailed = 0.08).  This is consistent with prior literature and auditing 
standards indicating that uncertainty increases the risk of misstatement.  I asked participants 
“... how would you rate the controller’s technical accounting knowledge?” (0=Very Weak 
Knowledge, 5= Average Knowledge, 10=Very Strong Knowledge; mean=5.1); there was no 
significant difference in perceptions of management knowledge between conditions (i.e. all 
ptwo-tailed  0.17).16  Thus, follow-up questions reveal that participants believed that the 
adjustment was material and my manipulations did not effect participants’ perceptions of 
management competence.  
4.2 Hypotheses Tests 
Test of H1: Joint Influence of Estimate Uncertainty and Management’s Evidential Support 
on Auditor Comfort with Management’s estimate 
 H1 predicts that when outcome uncertainty is Extreme, auditors are more 
comfortable with an estimate with More evidential support.  However, when uncertainty is 
Moderate auditors are more comfortable with an estimate with Less evidential support.  
Table 1 (Panel A) provides descriptive statistics (see Figure 2 for a graphical representation) 
for participants’ comfort with management’s warranty accrual adjustment.  I present the 
ANOVA and planned simple main effects tests for auditor comfort in Panels B and C.  
Auditor comfort is a composite measure, taking the average of participant responses to two 
                                                
16 Results reported in Table 1 are robust to controlling for participants’ perceptions of the controller’s 
knowledge. 
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questions designed to capture their perception of management’s warranty estimate (‘comfort 
with’ and ‘overall reasonableness’ of management’s adjustment).17 
 ANOVA results (Table 1 Panel B) provide support for H1 with a significant 
interaction of Uncertainty and Support (F(1,80) = 7.38; pone-tailed < 0.01).  I present contrast 
tests in Table 1, Panel C, and these provide additional insight into the predicted interaction.  
Consistent with conventional wisdom, when there was Extreme uncertainty participants were 
significantly less comfortable with management’s estimate when there was Less evidential 
support (mean = -1.37) than when there was More support (mean = -0.12)  (F(1,80) = 4.41; 
pone-tailed = 0.02).  Additionally, participants in Moderate uncertainty condition were 
significantly more comfortable with Less evidential support (mean = 1.01) than More 
evidential support (mean = 0.03) (F(1,80) = 3.13; pone-tailed = 0.04).  Overall, these results 
support H1. 
Test of H2: Mediating Role of Comfort on Expected Adjustment 
 H2 predicts that auditor comfort with management’s estimate will mediate auditor’s 
expected adjustment to management’s financial statements.  To test this hypothesis, I 
conduct a mediation analysis using Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four-step process.18  Results 
of this mediation provide support for my hypothesis (see Figure 3).  Step one, I show a 
significant association between the interaction of uncertainty and support and the expected 
                                                
17 Results reported in Table 1 are robust to using either of these two measures independently (see Appendix 2, 
Table B1) or combining them using a Principal Component Analysis (PCA).  I additionally asked participants 
to indicate whether management’s adjustment was either (1) Reasonable (2) Right on the border between 
reasonable and unreasonable, or (3) Not reasonable; ordinal logistic analysis supports H1 with a significant 
interaction (z = 2.13; pone-tailed = 0.02); however results do not reveal a main effect of uncertainty (z = 0.75; pone-
tailed = 0.23) as found using the other reasonableness measures. 
18 I discuss my mediation in terms of p-values (Baron and Kenny 1986); however the sensitivity of p-values to 
sample size and the notion that mediation does not require a significant association between the independent 
variable and the dependent variable (step one) has lead some to recommend different methods for testing 
mediation (Kenny 2012).  Thus, I also ran a Sobel test of the indirect effect, which further supports my 
hypothesis (pone-tailed = 0.04; bootstrapped pone-tailed = 0.05) (Sobel 1982; Shrout and Bolger 2002). 
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adjustment (t(80) = −2.54; pone-tailed = 0.01).  Additionally, in Table 2, Panel A I provide 
descriptive statistics for participants’ assessment of the expected adjustment to the financial 
statements.19  ANOVA results are presented in Table 2 Panel B and provide support for step 
one, with a significant interaction of Uncertainty and Support (F(1,80) = 6.45; pone-tailed = 
0.01).  Contrast tests in table 2, Panel C show results similar to those for auditor comfort.  In 
the Extreme uncertainty condition participant estimates were significantly higher when there 
was Less evidential support (mean = 1,596) than when there was More support (mean = 772)  
(F(1,80) = 4.96; pone-tailed = 0.01).  Additionally, participant estimates in the Moderate 
uncertainty condition were significantly higher when there was More evidential support 
(mean = 860) than when there was Less evidential support (mean = 387) (F(1,80) = 1.81; 
pone-tailed = 0.09). 
 Step two, as reported in H1, I show a significant association between the interaction 
of uncertainty and support and auditor comfort with management’s estimate (t(80) = 2.72; 
pone-tailed < 0.01).  Step three, I show a significant association between auditor comfort and 
expected adjustment (t(79) = −2.36; pone-tailed = 0.01).  Step four, I show that controlling for 
auditor comfort weakens the association between the interaction of uncertainty and support, 
and expected adjustment (t(79) = −1.81; pone-tailed = 0.04).  Overall, these results support a 
partial mediation and thus provide support for H2, that auditor comfort with management’s 
estimate mediates auditor expected adjustments. 
                                                
19 Auditor responses to the expected audit adjustment question were adjusted for management’s proposed 
estimate of $7,507,500, and thus indicate the auditor’s expected adjustment on top of management’s estimate. 
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4.3 Supplemental Analysis 
Support for theory and examination of alternative explanations   
 My theory predicts that the extent of auditor systematic information processing is 
driving their level of comfort.  In this section I provide support that systematic processing 
drives auditor comfort when the level of estimate uncertainty and degree of management’s 
evidentiary support are misaligned, but not when they are aligned.  I also rule out the 
alternative that the degree of management’s evidentiary support changes the perceived level 
of uncertainty and thus changes auditor comfort.  
 To determine the extent of systematic information processing used by auditors to 
determine comfort I examine auditor perceptions of case information that one might expect 
to affect their level of comfort, if they use systematic information processing.  Under 
systematic processing, one could expect auditor’s level of comfort to reflect a combination 
of their perceptions of (1) the amount of support, (2) adequacy of support, (3) comfort with 
support, (4) appropriateness of management’s analysis, (5) conservativeness of 
management’s estimate, and (6) confidence in their assessment of risk.20  I create a 
composite measure of systematic processing by summing auditor responses to questions 
measuring these six items.21  As expected, increased systematic processing increases auditor 
comfort (F(1,81) = 12.98; pone-tailed < 0.01).  More importantly, in support of my theory, 
                                                
20 Specific questions were (1) How much evidence is available to support the warranty accrual adjustment? 
(minimal evidence = 0, extensive evidence = 10), (2) How adequate is the available audit evidence on which 
you can base your opinion pertaining to the warranty accrual? (not very adequate = 0, very adequate = 10), (3) 
How comfortable are you with the amount of available audit evidence pertaining to the warranty accrual? (not 
very comfortable = 0, very comfortable = 10), (4) How appropriate was management’s analysis of the warranty 
issue? (very inappropriate = 0, very appropriate = 10), (5) How would you characterize management’s 
adjustment to the warranty accrual? (conservative = 0, aggressive=10), (6) How confident are you of your 
assessment of a material misstatement of the warranty accrual? (not very confident = 0, very confident = 10). 
21 I sum these six measures so that the information each question captures is given equal weight in the 
systematic processing; thus, I make as few assumptions about the weighting of the different aspects of 
information as possible. 
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systematic processing mediates auditor comfort when estimate uncertainty and management 
support are misaligned (Sobel mediation test: pone-tailed = 0.04; bootstrapped pone-tailed = 0.02), 
but not when they are aligned (Sobel mediation test: pone-tailed = 0.40; bootstrapped pone-tailed = 
0.41).22  This finding provides support that my predicted interaction is driven by the extent 
of auditor’s systematic information processing and not by differences in their perceptions of 
management’s evidentiary support or analysis. 
 Another alternative explanation is that auditor’s interpret the degree of management’s 
evidentiary support as an indicator of the level of uncertainty.  I test this alternative by 
measuring auditors’ perceptions of the uncertainty of the estimate and see if it varies with 
evidential support.  Auditors provided the low and high end of a range of adjustments in 
response to the question “What range of adjustments to the warranty accrual would you 
accept as reasonable for management to record in the financial statements?”  Participants in 
the Extreme condition reported a significantly wider range (mean = 4,032) than participants 
in the Moderate uncertainty condition (mean = 2002) (F(1,80) = 22.75; pone-tailed < 0.01), but 
there were no main or simple effects of support (i.e. all pone-tailed 0.24).  These results, 
together with those discussed above indicate that management’s evidentiary support had no 
effect on auditor’s perceived uncertainty, and provide further evidence that HSM and 
misalignment between level of uncertainty and degree of evidential support drives my 
interaction.  This also demonstrates how subtle factors, unique to the audit setting, can have 
significant influence on auditor comfort. 
                                                
22 Mediation results under Baron and Kenny’s (1986) four-step method are consistent with the results of the 
Sobel test, with full mediation (step four ptwo-tailed = 0.321) in the misalignment conditions and no mediation in 
the alignment conditions (step four ptwo-tailed = 0.037). 
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Perceived assurance provided to users of the financial statements.   
 Recently, the PCAOB and researchers have proposed that auditors communicate the 
amount of assurance provided on different aspects of the financial statements (PCAOB 
2010c; Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012).  Auditor evaluation of the level of 
assurance provided to users of the financial statements is very subjective, especially when 
dealing with highly uncertain estimates.  Given the subjectivity of the level of assurance and 
no clear benchmark, I predict that auditors’ assessed level of assurance will be largely 
similar to their assessed level of comfort with the estimate.  As such, if auditors are more 
comfortable with an estimate, they will presume that they are providing higher assurance 
over that estimate to users of the financial statements.   
 I examine auditor responses to the question “What level of assurance are you able to 
provide over the warranty accrual to users of the financial statements?” (0=Low Assurance, 
5=Reasonable Assurance, 10=Almost Absolute Assurance) and report the results in Table 3.  
I report descriptive statistics in Table 3, Panel A.  The pattern of results is similar to those 
found for auditor comfort; principally, the level of assurance in the Extreme uncertainty 
condition is higher when there is More support (mean = 4.38) than when there is Less 
support (mean = 3.62); and the level of assurance in the Moderate uncertainty condition is 
higher when there is Less support (mean = 4.99) than when there is More support (mean = 
4.42).  An ANCOVA (Table 3, Panel B) provides support for this with a significant 
interaction of uncertainty and support (F(1,77) = 2.57; pone-tailed = 0.06).23  Therefore, further 
research into auditor assessments of the level of assurance provided over financial 
                                                
23 I control for auditors preliminary evaluations of risk of material misstatement (RMM) because it has a 
significant effect on auditor perception of the level of assurance provided; including preliminary RMM also 
reduces my number of observations to 82.  Without controlling for preliminary RMM, results are weaker but 
still marginally significant (F(1,80) = 1.71; pone-tailed = 0.10). 
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statements may be warranted before implementation of expanded auditor disclosure of 
assurance. 
Discussion of all experimental variables 
 In Appendix B I discuss and tabulate statistics on all variables collected as part of this 
dissertation.  In Section 1, 2, and 3 I define each variable, discuss why I collected it, and 
discuss the results.  In Appendix B, Table B1, B2 and B3, I tabulated statistics for every 
variable and provide means and ANOVA results.  I discuss variables and present the results 
in three groups.  In Section 1, I discuss results on my primary variables of interest (tabulated 
in Table B1) and other audit planning variables that may be impacted by auditor comfort 
(e.g. risk of material misstatement, and additional audit work).  In Section 2, I discuss results 
on all variables I use to compose my measure of systematic processing (tabulated in Table 
B2).  In Section 3 I present other variables measured in the experiment, including context 
checks and control variables (tabulated in Table B3).  These results are disclosed to 
demonstrate the robustness of the findings reported in this paper but caution should be taken 
before drawing conclusions from the results. 
4.4 Normative Judgments 
 I predict that alignment between the level of uncertainty and the degree of 
management’s evidentiary support subtly enhances auditor systematic thinking, leading to 
less auditor comfort.  Within my context, I posit that auditors are unaware of the influence of 
alignment and are not consciously processing more or less systematically.  Most audit 
observers would presume that auditors should be more comfortable with management’s 
estimate when it is More supported.  Alternatively, my dissertation reveals a situation where 
auditors prefer a less supported management estimate, a finding that is difficult to reconcile 
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with audit regulations, auditor skepticism, or normative models of decision making.24  There 
is a long history behind the notion that better judgments are made when all available 
information is incorporated (Bernoulli 1713, Keynes 1921, Carnap 1947).  Audit regulations 
further support the notion that more support is better by indicating that more evidence should 
be gathered in response to significant risks (PCAOB 2010a).  However, the claim that more 
information is better has recently come under criticism because incorporating more 
information may reduce predictive ability (c.f. Gigerenzer and Brighton 2009).  In the 
moderate uncertainty condition, where auditors are more comfortable with a less supported 
estimate, it is difficult to perceive that the auditor judgments are the most appropriate.  
However, there are conditions under which these judgments may be considered appropriate, 
and I address some of these below. 
 There are several conditions under which the auditor may actually be acting 
normatively by being more comfortable with less supported estimates.  First, the additional 
support items may not be diagnostic or may represent over-fitting, such that management’s 
inclusion of them actually expands the parameter space without improved accuracy (c.f. 
Myung and Pitt 1997).  For instance, in an expanded version of my context each type of 
evidentiary support could indicate a different appropriate estimate, such that the evidence 
could support any estimate.  In this situation, additional support increases the parameter 
space, making it more difficult to falsify management’s estimate.   My research design 
largely mitigates the notion that the additional support items outweigh their value.  In the 
Less support condition management establishes their estimate based on industry information 
                                                
24 For the purpose of this discussion I assume that auditor information processing is a costless activity.  If I 
instead assume that information processing is a costly activity, the benefit of systematic processing would have 
to be higher in the misalignment conditions than in the alignment conditions to offset the increased cost.  
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and inquiry of their technicians; whereas in the More support condition they also reviewed 
records and performed field inspections.  Viewing management’s support as audit evidence 
reveals that the evidence in the Less condition is inferior to the evidence in the More 
condition, per extent audit standards.  Industry information is generally noisier than 
company specific information and thus is unlikely to be considered better evidence (Budescu 
et al. 2012).  Regarding inquiry, the PCAOB indicates that inquiry alone is insufficient 
evidence on which to base an opinion (PCAOB 2010a).  Thus, it is unlikely that auditors 
perceive the additional support items in the More condition as being detrimental to arriving 
at an appropriate conclusion. 
 Auditors in the Less evidence condition may believe that the universe of available 
support is so small that the estimate represents an unknowable uncertainty.  Research has 
found that people have less aversion to unknowable uncertainty than to known uncertainty; 
thus, auditors may be more comfortable with less supported estimates because they represent 
an unknowable uncertainty (Chow and Sarin 2002).  To the extent that participants believed 
that the universe of available support was small because they did not systematically evaluate 
the estimate, my theory and predictions hold.  Alternatively, if the additional support items 
(or other conceivable support) were so unexpected that my manipulation caused participants 
to perceived a smaller universe of available support, then participant’s higher level of 
comfort with less support may be reasonable.  I designed the experiment, and asked follow-
up questions to mitigate and address this concern.  I designed the experiment using a 
warranty liability because gathering and evaluating audit evidence for a warranty liability is 
familiar to the participants in my study.  I also intentionally included support items in the 
More condition that would be common in this type of setting.  I tested my choice of 
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supporting items by asking participants at the end of the experiment “what else, if anything, 
could management do to obtain additional evidence?” and eighty percent of participants 
responded in both the More and the Less conditions.  Of the participants that responded in 
the Less condition, forty-nine percent listed review of company information and twenty-
three percent indicated physical inspection, as additional support management could 
gather.25  Overall, the warranty estimate in my experiment is not likely considered an 
unknowable uncertainty that would change auditor aversion to the uncertainty posed by the 
estimate. 
 Overall, it is difficult to argue that auditors in my dissertation are acting normatively 
when there is alignment in the moderate uncertainty condition, because they are more 
comfortable with a less supported management estimate.  Running an experiment with 
experienced auditors where they complete a realistic audit task limits my ability to control 
explicitly for participant perceptions of either the quality of the evidence, or the universe of 
available evidence.  However, my 2x2 experimental design, interaction hypotheses, and 
results that show higher auditor comfortable with more support under extreme uncertainty, 
lends additional support to the notion that More support is valuable and that the uncertainty 
is not unknowable.  Thus, research, audit standards and the design of the experiment all 
suggest that auditors are not acting in a manner that ensures the highest audit quality in the 
Moderate uncertainty condition, where I find that they are more comfortable with less 
supported management estimates.   
                                                
25 Apart from inspecting a sample of installations and reviewing installation (or similar) records, common 
support items were; reviewing historical failure rates and repair costs related to the installation issue, reviewing 
customer complaints, performing a more detailed analysis by installation technician or installation team, and 




 In this dissertation, I predict that misalignment between the degree of management’s 
evidentiary support and level of estimate uncertainty decreases auditor comfort and increases 
auditor expected financial statement adjustment.  As predicted, when uncertainty is 
moderate, auditors perceive management estimates that are less supported as relatively more 
reasonable; however, under extreme uncertainty, I find that auditors perceive less supported 
estimates as less reasonable.  I also find that auditor’s response to alignment between the 
degree of management’s evidentiary support and estimate uncertainty pervades other 
judgments, such as the expected adjustment to the financial statements and perception of the 
level of assurance provided to users of the financial statements.  My results reveal that 
auditor reliance on management affects their judgments of what constitutes sufficient 
appropriate audit evidence; however, subtle factors can prompt heightened auditor 
skepticism.   
 This dissertation also informs recent proposals that recommend that auditors indicate 
sliding degrees of assurance depending on such factors as the uncertainty and auditability of 
management estimates (PCAOB 2010c; Christensen et al. 2012; Bell and Griffin 2012).  
Underlying such a change is the assumption that auditor assessments of assurance are 
representative of the underlying assurance provided.  My theory and findings indicate that 
auditor comfort and assessments of assurance provided to users of the financial statements 
can be inconsistent with the general understanding that more evidential support equates to 
higher assurance.  These findings reveal one limitation of auditors revealing their perception 
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of the assurance provided over management estimates and highlight the need for additional 
research prior to implementing new standards. 
 Overall, my theory-consistent, but potentially troubling finding that auditors can be 
more comfortable with management estimates supported by less evidence demonstrates an 
important implication of auditors’ inadvertent failure to critically evaluate management’s 
selection of supporting evidence.  However, I also find that auditors are able to notice subtle 
factors such as misalignment between the degree of management’s evidentiary support and 
estimate uncertainty, which prompt heightened skepticism.  My theory and findings may be 
of help to regulators as they seek to ensure sufficient auditor skepticism and to researchers as 
they examine the implications of estimate uncertainty on auditor judgments. 
 This dissertation was conducted using experienced auditor participants in an audit 
context; however, the findings will likely generalize to other contexts.  Most obviously, my 
findings would generalize to other evaluation and assurance contexts such as regulatory or 
insurance reviews.  More broadly, my results reveal the importance of distinguishing 
between an individual’s evaluation of the situation and their actions going forward.  In my 
context, I find that auditor evaluation of management and the estimate reflect general 
uncertainty aversion and more information is preferred, as illustrated by my measure of 
systematic reasoning. However, auditor judgments deviate from most predictions of 
judgment under uncertainty for auditor actions going forward, as demonstrated by their level 
of comfort and expected adjustment.  Thus, despite recognizing the level of uncertainty and 
the degree of management’s evidentiary support the auditor can be more comfortable with 
regard to their future actions.  Past studies have frequently used confidence as the dependent 
variable to measure the affect of uncertainty on individual judgments (e.g. Budescu et al. 
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2003); however, in my context even auditor confidence in their judgment of the risk of 
misstatement does not capture their level of comfort.  Overall, this dissertation reveals the 
important distinction between evaluating the uncertainty of a situation and being 
comfortable proceeding despite this uncertainty, a finding that can be applied in many 
different contexts. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
 The findings in this dissertation are subject to several limitations that present 
opportunities for future research examining auditor judgments under uncertainty.  I test my 
predictions using a single interaction between the auditor and management. Thus, this study 
does not provide opportunity for auditors to interact with managers.  Auditor interaction with 
management could strengthen my results if managers are able to exploit reduced auditor 
systematic processing, for example, holding back evidentiary support to increase auditor 
comfort.  Alternatively, auditors may not be influenced by alignment under conditions of 
consistent interaction with management where they are able to learn about that specific 
management.  To help mitigate this concern I used experienced auditors in a familiar 
context; however, future research could examine auditor judgments in a repeated interaction 
context and test the extent to which auditor judgments may change over time.  Lastly, I 
examine audit judgments at the planning stage to capture auditor initial impressions that can 
influence all future aspects of the audit.  Future research could examine the extent to which 
these judgments impact later aspects of the audit or investigate methods to mitigate the affect 
of alignment. 
 Future research could further investigate the impact of the level of uncertainty on 
auditor judgments.  My finding that auditors can be more comfortable with uncertain 
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estimates supported by less evidence suggests that they potentially become acclimatized to 
moderate risk.  This finding is consistent with prior research that suggests that professional 
skepticism decreases with auditor experience (Payne and Ramsay 2005).  Could such 
acclimatization essentially change auditor perceptions of extreme uncertainty to the point 
where it is viewed as if it were moderate, seemingly warranting decreased attention?  Further 






1.  Company Background 
 




It is February 2012 and you are auditing the December 31, 2011 financial-statements of Advanced Network 
Services (ANS), a publically traded professional services company with approximately $85 million in annual 
revenue.   
 
ANS focuses on providing network installation, maintenance and equipment leasing services to businesses 
across the U.S.  ANS prides itself in providing outstanding customer service through network design, 
installation, and long-term maintenance agreements. 
 
ANS’s revenue has increased 25% over the past two years due to acquisitions and organic growth in network 
upgrades and maintenance revenue.  However, recent economic conditions have pushed prices down and net 
income has remained relatively flat despite top-line growth in sales volume.  The company has been under 
increased pressure from investors to convert sales growth into earnings growth this year, through increased 
operating margins and lower expenses. 
 
ANS is a large client for your office, with significant billable hours and audit fees. Your audit team has been 
working on the ANS audit for the past three years and you feel that your team has a strong working relationship 
with both the audit committee and ANS management. Your impression is that management is competent and 




In response to the growth of high bandwidth Internet-based audio and video content, ANS began using a 
technologically advanced router (the R3a) in all new installations and upgrades last year.  The R3a router 








ANS provides a two-year warranty on all network installations and routinely provides warranty services after 
the two-year warranty period to maintain its high level of customer satisfaction.   
 
ANS estimates warranty costs based on historical and projected failure rates, historical and projected repair 
costs and knowledge of specific product failures.  Each quarter, ANS reevaluates its estimate to assess the 
adequacy of its warranty liability, and adjusts the amount as necessary.   
 
As with similar companies, determining future warranty costs is an important accounting estimate and a critical 
audit issue, requiring considerable audit attention.  In the audit team’s judgment, the warranty accrual has been 










In early December 2011, ANS’s controller informed the audit team that a significant number of R3a routers 
were installed incorrectly, resulting in an unexpected increase in warranty costs.  At that time ANS was 
working to assess the extent of the problem and financial statement impact. 
 
ANS intends to repair all incorrect installations of the R3a to ensure minimal downtime for their customers.  




In late December 2011, an industry publication reported the results of a survey of 50 corporate IT managers.  
The survey reported that 75% of all R3a router installations are not in accordance with manufacturer 
guidelines.  
 
The publication indicated that correct R3a router installation differs slightly from the installation of other 
popular routers and that this difference was the source of most of the problems.  Incorrect installation results in 
inconsistent speed and higher than anticipated failure rates.   
 
 
Risk of Material Misstatement 
Based on a review of warranty costs through November 2011, the necessary adjustment to the warranty accrual 
is almost certainly in excess of quantitative materiality of $1.3 million that was set during audit planning.   
 
Please respond to the following question by placing a vertical slash ( | ) on the scale. 
 




  0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Low Somewhat Average Somewhat Very High 





Warranty Accrual  
Update 
 
It is now mid-February 2012, and ANS has prepared the unaudited December 31, 2011 financial statements 
(pending final warranty accrual).   
 
Based on test work completed so far, your team has not identified any material audit adjustments or significant 
deficiencies in internal control, including internal controls related to the warranty accrual. 
 
The ratio of warranty costs to installation revenue increased in 2011 to 7.7%, from about 4% observed in 
previous years.  ANS linked the increase in warranty repairs to incorrect installations of the R3a router, and has 
been working diligently to assess the magnitude of the problem.   
 
Past warranty costs and warranty accrual, before considering pending adjustment for the R3a installation issue, 
are as follows: 
 
   2009  2010  2011 
Warranty Costs      
 Actual warranty costs $   2,850,000   $   2,980,000   $   6,550,000  
 As a percent of revenue under warranty 4.2%  3.9%  7.7% 
       
Warranty Accrual      
 Installation revenue under warranty $ 67,200,000   $ 76,850,000   $ 84,800,000  
 Projected repair rate* 4.0%  4.0%  4.0% 
 Warranty Accrual $   2,688,000   $   3,074,000   $   3,392,000  
       
 
* Projected repair rate has not been updated to incorporate the R3a installation issue. 
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2.  Extreme Uncertainty and Less Evidential Support Condition 
 
Industry Inquiry 
ANS’s controller inquired of similar companies to determine what they were accruing for the R3a installation 
issue.  The controller summarized the results of those inquiries below and shared them with your audit team. 
• The range of incorrect installations is quite wide, from a low of 25% to a high of 85%. 
• Estimated repair costs for each incorrect installation are between $550 and $750. 
Other companies estimated the number of incorrect installations and the cost of repair based on inquiries of 
their installation technicians.   
 
ANS Evidence 
ANS has been performing inquiries of its own installation technicians and plans to provide your audit team that 
information as soon as it is completed.   
ANS’s nationwide installation base, recent acquisitions, and growth over the last two years have made it 
difficult to pinpoint the extent of incorrect R3a installations.   
 
 
The engagement partner discussed the difficulty of obtaining evidence with the controller and agreed that the 





From: ANS Controller 
Date:  February 15, 2012 




We committed extensive resources to gathering information regarding the R3a installation issue.  Based on the 
information gathered from companies with similar installation issues we initially identified a relatively wide 
range of incorrect installations between 25% and 85% and estimated cost per repair between $550 and $750.   
 
Company specific inquiries of installation technicians from each region provided limited information.  
Inquiries revealed wide variation across offices and supports continued use of the relatively wide range 




Based on this evidence, our conclusion is to record a total adjustment to warranty accrual of $7,507,500, which 
reflects an incorrect installation rate of 55% and an estimated repair cost of $650 per unit.  
 
This adjustment will have a significant impact on net income.  We are planning a press release to inform the 
market in the next week, ahead of issuing our annual report on March 1. 
 
 
Warranty Accrual Adjustment      
 Low  High  Best Estimate 
Number of R3a installations  21,000    21,000    21,000  
Estimated percent of incorrect installations 25%  85%  55% 
Estimated number of incorrect installations 5,250   17,850   11,550 
Estimated cost per installation $           550   $             750   $           650  
Estimated repair costs $ 2,887,500   $ 13,387,500   $ 7,507,500 
      




Our estimate of $7.5 million is $5.9 million away from the high end of the range, so any variation in percent of 
incorrect installations or costs from our estimate could result in a material difference.   
 
Given the wide variation observed in the limited available evidence, recording an adjustment based on the 
midpoint of the percent of incorrect installations and cost per repair seems reasonable at this time. 
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3.  Moderate Uncertainty and More Evidential Support Condition 
 
Industry Inquiry 
ANS’s controller inquired of similar companies to determine what they were accruing for the R3a installation 
issue.  The controller summarized the results of those inquiries below and shared them with your audit team. 
• The range of incorrect installations is quite narrow, from a low of 50% to a high of 60%. 
• Estimated repair costs for each incorrect installation are between $600 and $700. 
Other companies estimated the number of incorrect installations and the cost of repair based on inquiries of 
their installation technicians.   
 
ANS Evidence 
ANS has been performing inquiries of its own installation technicians and plans to provide your audit team that 
information as soon as it is completed.   
ANS’s nationwide installation base, recent acquisitions, and growth over the last two years have made it 
difficult to pinpoint the extent of incorrect R3a installations.   
To get a better sense of the number of incorrect installations, the controller and his team are also performing: 
• A review of R3a installation records, and 
• Sending quality control inspectors into the field to physically examine a sample of R3a installations. 
The engagement partner discussed the difficulty of obtaining evidence with the controller and agreed that the 






From: ANS Controller 
Date:  February 15, 2012 




We committed extensive resources to gathering information regarding the R3a installation issue.  Based on the 
information gathered from companies with similar installation issues, we initially identified a relatively narrow 
range of incorrect installations between 50% and 60% and estimated cost per repair between $600 and $700.   
 
Company specific information from several different sources provided considerable information.  
 
We accumulated and analyzed the following information that we are making available to your audit team: 
• Inquiries of installation technicians from each region  
• Detailed review of installation records for our 600 largest projects (about 15% of R3a installations) 
• Summary findings from 30 judgmentally selected site inspections by our quality control inspectors 
 
This information revealed little variation across offices and supports continued use of the relatively narrow 
range identified across the industry.   
 
Estimate 
Based on this evidence, our conclusion is to record a total adjustment to warranty accrual of $7,507,500, which 
reflects an incorrect installation rate of 55% and an estimated repair cost of $650 per unit.  
 
This adjustment will have a significant impact on net income.  We are planning a press release to inform the 
market in the next week, ahead of issuing our annual report on March 1. 
 
 
Warranty Accrual Adjustment      
 Low  High  Best Estimate 
Number of R3a installations  21,000    21,000    21,000  
Estimated percent of incorrect installations 50%  60%  55% 
Estimated number of incorrect installations  10,500    12,600    11,550 
Estimated cost per installation $           600   $           700   $           650  
Estimated repair costs $ 6,300,000  $ 8,820,000  $ 7,507,500 
      




Our estimate of $7.5 million is $1.3 million away from the high end of the range, so any variation in percent of 
incorrect installations or costs from our estimate will not likely result in a material difference.   
 
Given the minimal variation observed in the extensive available evidence, recording an adjustment based on 





4.  Dependent Variables, and Process Measures 
 
Evaluation of the Warranty Accrual 
 
1. Based on the information provided, is it more likely that management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual 
of $7,507,500 is reasonable or not reasonable? 
 [  ] Reasonable 
 [  ] Right on the border between Reasonable and Unreasonable. 
 [  ] Not Reasonable 
 
For all scale questions, please respond by placing a vertical slash ( | ) on the related scale. 
 
2. Rate the overall reasonableness of management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty accrual? 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
  −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0     1     2     3     4     5 
 Not at all   Just Meets Very  
 Reasonable Reasonableness Reasonable 
  Threshold 
 
3.  How would you characterize management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual? 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Conservative   Neutral / Aggressive 
  Balanced 
 
4. How likely are you to propose an audit adjustment to the warranty accrual? 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very   As Likely Very  
 Likely As Not Likely  
 
5. How appropriate was management’s analysis of the warranty issue? 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0     1     2     3     4     5 
 Very   As Appropriate Very  
 Inappropriate As Not Appropriate  
 
6. How comfortable are you with management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual? 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0     1     2     3     4     5 
 Very   As Comfortable Very  
 Uncomfortable As Not Comfortable  
 
7. How would you assess the risk of material misstatement of the warranty accrual?  
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Low Somewhat Average Somewhat Very High 
 Risk Below Average Risk  Above Average Risk  
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Evaluation of the Warranty Accrual 
 
 
If you do not have a calculator available there is a calculation matrix at the back of the case materials that 
you can use to assist with your responses to the questions below. 
 
1. What adjustment to the warranty accrual do you believe is most reasonable for ANS to record in the 
financial statements?  
 
Most Reasonable Adjustment:  $ ________________________ (in thousands)  
 
2. What range of adjustments to the warranty accrual would you accept as reasonable for ANS to record in the 
financial statements? 
 
Lowest Reasonable Adjustment: $ ________________________ (in thousands)  
 
Highest Reasonable Adjustment: $ ________________________ (in thousands)  
 
3.  What adjustment to the warranty accrual do you believe will most likely be recorded in the financial 
statements? 
 
Most Likely Adjustment:  $ ________________________ (in thousands)  
 













4.  How likely is it that the final repair cost of the incorrect router installations will turn out to be materially 
different than the warranty accrual adjustment that you indicated was the ‘most reasonable adjustment’? 
 
  |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
   0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very As Likely Very  





Evaluation of the Warranty Accrual 
 
5.  How difficult would it be for you to demonstrate to the following parties that the estimate you 
provided in question #1 on the previous page should be recorded in the financial statements? 
 
Partner on the engagement 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
  0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very   Average Very 




  0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very   Average Very 
 Difficult Difficulty Difficult 
 
 
 Audit quality reviewer (i.e. PCAOB) 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
  0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very   Average Very 












Follow Up Questions Part 1 
 
1.  How confident are you of your assessment of a material misstatement of the warranty accrual?  
 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very Reasonably Very  
 Confident Confident Confident 
 
2.  How adequate is the available audit evidence on which you can base your opinion pertaining to 
the warranty accrual? 
 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very Average Very  
 Adequate Adequacy Adequate 
 




 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very   Average Degree Very  
 Comfortable of Comfort Comfortable
  
 
4. How much additional test work do you anticipate you would need to complete to be comfortable 
with the warranty accrual?  
 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Minimal Average Extensive 
 Additional Additional Additional 
 Test Work Test Work Test Work
  
5. How much evidence is available to support the warranty accrual adjustment? 
 
   |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Minimal Average Extensive 





Follow Up Questions Part 2 
 
6.  How predictable is the controller’s response to your evaluation of the warranty adjustment? 
 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very Average Very  
 Predictable Predictability Predictable 
 
 
7. Based on the information provided, how would you rate the controller’s technical accounting 
knowledge?   
 
  |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Very Weak Average Very Strong  




8.  Is the warranty accrual adjustment decision material to ANS’s financial statements? 
 
  |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Very As Likely Very  
 Likely As Not Likely 
 
 
9.  What level of assurance are you able to provide over the warranty accrual to users of the financial 
statements? 
 
  |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Low Reasonable Almost Absolute  
 Assurance Assurance Assurance 
 
 
10.  What level of assurance do you believe investors perceive that you provide over the warranty 
accrual? 
 
  |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Low Reasonable Almost Absolute  






5.  Manipulation Check Questions 
 
Follow Up Questions 
 
Please respond to the following questions by placing a check mark on the box that applies. 
 
1.  Which range of potential costs of the repair based on the industry information was discussed in this case 
(check the most appropriate)? 
 
[  ] Between 25% and 85% 
 
[  ] Between 50% and 60% 
 
[  ] Equally likely 
 
[  ] Other: Specify _________ 
 
 
2.  Which of the following information did management accumulate and analyze in determining the adjustment 
to the warranty accrual (check the most appropriate)? 
 
[  ] Inquiries of installation technicians from each region  
 
[  ] Detailed review of installation records for our 600 largest projects (about 15% of R3a installations) 
 
[  ] Summary findings from 30 site inspections by our quality control inspector 
 





6.  Demographic Questions 
 
Questions About Your Professional Experience 
 
1. How many years of work experience do you have in audit or assurance services? __________ 
 
2. How many years of public company audit experience do you have? __________ 
 
3. What is your current position or job title (e.g. senior, manager, partner, etc.)? 
____________________ 
 
4.  How familiar are you with the accounting for estimates? 
 
 |-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----| 
 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 
 Not Somewhat Very 
 Familiar Familiar Familiar 
 




 0     1     2     3     4     5     6     7     8     9     10 




Discussion of All Experimental Variables 
 
1.  Primary Variables of Interest and Audit Planning Variables 
 I study auditor judgments in the planning phase of the audit of an unusual warranty 
estimate and ask a series of questions regarding the planning, performance and conclusion of 
the audit.  Table B1 of this appendix tabulates descriptive statistics and basic ANOVA 
results for my primary variables of interest and other variables related to auditor planning 
judgments.  Overall, patterns of results are similar to my primary variables of interest, 
however statistical significance varies.  In general, when uncertainty is moderate and support 
is less auditors are (1) less likely to require an adjustment, (2) report a lower risk of material 
misstatement, (3) believe that the most, the lowest and the highest appropriate adjustments 
are lower, and (4) less likely that the ultimate realization is materially different; however, 
they believe that more additional work will need to be done.  Alternatively, when uncertainty 
is extreme and support is less auditors are (1) more likely to require an adjustment, (2) 
believe that the most, the lowest and the highest appropriate adjustments are higher, and (3) 
less likely that the ultimate realization is materially different; however, they report a slightly 
lower risk of material misstatement, and they believe that less additional work will need to 
be done.  I choose the two broadest judgment questions (reasonableness and comfort) as my 
primary judgment variables, and the variable most closely linked to the audited financial 
statements (expected adjustment) as my primary dependent variables.  Overall, these results 
provide additional support for my findings, and demonstrate the robustness of using auditor 
comfort as my primary variable of interest. 
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Reasonable 
 Participants responded to the question “Based on the information provided, is it more 
likely that management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual of $7,507,500 is reasonable or 
not reasonable?” (1=Reasonable, 0=Right on the border between Reasonable and 
Unreasonable, -1=Not Reasonable).  A three point reasonable (or not) question mimics the 
need to issue either a clean or qualified audit report.  I anticipate responses to this question 
will be similar to the scale question.  Ordinal logistic results of Reasonable are reported in 
footnote 17 and support H1 with a significant interaction (z = 2.13; pone-tailed = 0.02); 
however, results do not reveal a main effect of uncertainty (z = 0.75; pone-tailed = 0.23) as 
found using the other reasonableness measures. 
Reasonableness 
 Participants responded to the question “Rate the overall reasonableness of 
management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty accrual?” (-5=Not at all Reasonable, 
0=Just Meets Reasonableness Threshold 5=Very Reasonable).  Audit regulations require 
auditors to evaluate the “reasonableness” of management’s estimate when providing an 
opinion on management’s financial statements.  Thus, reasonableness is a fundamental 
regulatory concept regarding management’s estimates.    ANOVA results (Table B1) provide 
support for my theory with a significant interaction of Uncertainty and Support (F(1,80) = 
6.97; ptwo-tailed = 0.01). 
Comfort 
 Participants responded to the question “How comfortable are you with management’s 
adjustment to the warranty accrual?” (-5=Very Uncomfortable, 0=As Comfortable As Not, 
5=Very Comfortable).  Auditors in practice frequently refer to the level of assurance as the 
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level of comfort over the financials.  Auditor comfort is a broad measure of assurance and 
captures items such as the reasonableness of the estimate as well as other audit risk factors.  
ANOVA results (Table B1) provide support for my theory with a significant interaction of 
Uncertainty and Support (F(1,80) = 4.88; ptwo-tailed = 0.03). 
Likely 
 Participants responded to the question “How likely are you to propose an audit 
adjustment to the warranty accrual?” (0=Not Very Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very 
Likely).  This measure reflects the both the magnitude of the issue and the auditor’s 
confidence that management’s estimate is not reasonable.  This also functions as a context 
check, as I expect participants to generally expect to propose an adjustment.  Results of 
Likely provide no significant results other than a main effect of Uncertainty ((F(1,80) = 4.20; 
ptwo-tailed = 0.04).  Consistent with my desired contextual manipulation, participants in all 
conditions believed that proposing an adjustment is at least somewhat likely (all means 
greater than 5).  
RMM 
 Participants responded to the question “How would you assess the risk of material 
misstatement of the warranty accrual?” (0=Low Risk, 2.5=Somewhat Below Average, 
5=Average Risk, 7.5=Somewhat Above Average, 10=Very High Risk).  The risk of material 
misstatement reflects an audit planning judgment on which many other judgments are based.  
RMM is better defined in audit standards than are concepts such as reasonableness and 
comfort, but it generally only includes a subset of audit risks.  Results of RMM provide no 




 Participants responded to the question “What adjustment to the warranty accrual do 
you believe is most reasonable for ANS to record in the financial statements?”  Auditor’s 
most appropriate adjustment measures their conclusion based on the evidence provided, 
before incorporating the strength of the evidence.  ANOVA results (Table B1) provide 
support for my theory with a significant interaction of Uncertainty and Support (F(1,80) = 
3.28; ptwo-tailed = 0.08).  Additionally, it should be noted that the average most appropriate 
adjustment is above materiality in all but the Moderate uncertainty and Less support 
condition, the condition where my theory warrants predicting that auditors are the most 
comfortable. 
Lowest and Highest 
 Participants responded to the question “What range of adjustments to the warranty 
accrual would you accept as reasonable for ANS to record in the financial statements?” 
(Lowest Reasonable Adjustment, Highest Reasonable Adjustment).  I measure the range of 
reasonable adjustments to capture auditor perception of the uncertainty of the estimate and to 
measure the lowest adjustment that the auditor would accept, because there is a chance that 
an aggressive manager may be able to push the adjustment down to that level.  Auditor’s 
Lowest appropriate adjustments were all very similar with no significant main or interaction 
affects (all p-values > 0.30).  However, The pattern of results for Highest and the ANOVA 
results (Table B1) provide support for my theory with a significant interaction of 
Uncertainty and Support (F(1,80) = 3.88; ptwo-tailed = 0.05). 
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Expected Adjustment 
 Participants responded to the question “What adjustment to the warranty accrual do 
you believe will most likely be recorded in the financial statements?”  I measure the 
adjustment the auditor perceives as the most likely to be recorded in the financial statements 
to get a close as possible to the estimate amount that will be recorded in the audited financial 
statements.  This measure incorporates the auditor’s perception of the most appropriate 
estimate and the strength of their position.  Results for auditors’ Expected Adjustment are 
discussed in the Chapter 4 of the dissertation and tabulated in Table 2. 
Different 
 Participants responded to the question “How likely is it that the final repair cost of 
the incorrect router installations will turn out to be materially different than the warranty 
accrual adjustment that you indicated was the ‘most reasonable adjustment’? “ (0=Not Very 
Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very Likely).  I measure the auditor’s perception of the 
uncertainty of the estimate in relation to the point estimate.  This provides a manipulation 
check for uncertainty and captures the perception of the risk associated with being materially 
different than the outcome.  Consistent with the uncertainty manipulation, participants in the 
Extreme uncertainty condition perceived the expected final cost as significantly more likely 
to be materially different than the estimate than participants in the Moderate uncertainty 
condition (F(1,80) = 4.80; ptwo-tailed = 0.01).  There is no indication of an interaction between 
Uncertainty and Support on auditors anticipated difference between the estimate and the 
final cost (F(1,80) = 0.12; ptwo-tailed = 0.74). 
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Additional Work 
 Participants responded to the question “How much additional test work do you 
anticipate you would need to complete to be comfortable with the warranty accrual?” (11-
point scale, 0=Minimal additional work, 5=Average additional work, 10=Extensive 
additional work).  I measure the amount of additional work the auditor expects, related to the 
estimate.  Similar to the risk of material misstatement, this is a direct audit planning 
judgment and captures the extent to which my manipulations influence planned evidence-
gathering activities.  Auditor’s evaluations of the Additional Work were all very similar with 
no significant main or interaction affects (all p-values > 0.13) and were assessed as 
significantly above average additional work in all conditions (Extreme/More, t(20) = 8.43 
ptwo-tailed <0.01; Extreme/Less, t(18) = 9.00 ptwo-tailed <0.01; Moderate/More, t(20) = 5.96 ptwo-
tailed <0.01; Moderate/Less, t(20) = 9.61 ptwo-tailed <0.01). 
2.  Variables Used to Compose Systematic Processing Measure 
 I capture six variables to compose my measure of systematic reasoning.  Table B2 of 
this appendix tabulates descriptive statistics and basic ANOVA results for the six variables 
used to compose my measure of systematic reasoning.  In contrast to the variables discussed 
in Section 1, these variables represent auditor evaluation of the inputs into management’s 
estimate.  As I note in the discussion of results, auditor evaluations of the inputs to 
management’s estimate are quite different than their resulting planning level judgments.  
Although not always significant, when support is less, auditors perceive (1) management as 
more aggressive, (2) management’s estimate as less appropriate, (3) the support as less 
adequate, (4) there being less available evidence, and are (5) less confident in the risk 
assessment, and (6) less comfortable with the evidence, regardless of the level of 
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uncertainty.  Overall, these results demonstrate an expected pattern where auditors prefer 
more support to less support. 
Aggressive 
 Participants responded to the question “How would you characterize management’s 
adjustment to the warranty accrual?” (0=Conservative, 5=Neutral/Balanced, 
10=Aggressive).  I measure auditor’s perception of the aggressiveness of management’s 
estimate to capture the extent to which management aggressiveness is driving auditor 
comfort.  In the experiment, management chooses an estimate based on the midpoint of the 
inputs, and thus I do not anticipant that auditors perceive them as overly aggressive.  
Auditor’s evaluations of management’s aggressiveness were all very similar across 
conditions, with no significant main or interaction affects (all p-values > 0.35).  
Appropriate 
 Participants responded to the question “How appropriate was management’s analysis 
of the warranty issue?” (-5=Very Inappropriate, 0=As Appropriate As Not, 5=Very 
Appropriate).  I measure the appropriateness of management’s estimate to capture the extent 
to which management’s actual evaluation of the estimate is driving auditor comfort.  
Auditor’s evaluations of the appropriateness of management’s analysis were significantly 
affected by the level of Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 5.66, ptwo-tailed = 0.02), but were unaffected by 
Support (F(1,80) = 0.32, ptwo-tailed = 0.57) and had no interactive affect  (F(1,80) = 0.26, ptwo-
tailed = 0.61).   
Confident 
 Participants responded to the question “How confident are you of your assessment of 
a material misstatement of the warranty accrual?” (0=Not Very Confident, 5=Reasonably 
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Confident, 10=Very Confident).  I measure auditor confidence to understand the extent to 
which auditor confidence is driving their comfort.  Earlier studies examining judgment under 
uncertainty use confidence as a measure of the effect of uncertainty on individual judgment 
(e.g. Budescu et al. 2003).  To the extent auditor confidence captures auditor uncertainty 
aversion, prior research predicts that auditors will be more confident with less uncertainty 
and more support (e.g. Kinney and Martin 1994; Hirst 1994; Barron, Pratt and Stice 2001; 
Smith and Kida 1991).  As expected under uncertainty aversion, ANOVA results show that 
auditors are more confident when there is more Support (F(1,80) = 5.52, ptwo-tailed = 0.02), 
and less Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 4.84, ptwo-tailed = 0.03), and more Support has a greater 
influence under Extreme uncertainty (F(1,80) = 2.99, ptwo-tailed = 0.09). 
Adequate 
 Participants responded to the question “How adequate is the available audit evidence 
on which you can base your opinion pertaining to the warranty accrual?” (0=Not Very 
Adequate, 5=Average Adequacy, 10=Very Adequate).  I measure auditor perceptions of the 
adequacy of the evidence to measure the extent to which auditor perceptions of the quality of 
evidence is driving auditor comfort.  Consistent with my manipulation, participants indicated 
that they were more comfortable in the More condition (mean = 3.9) than the Less condition 
(mean = 3.0) (F(1,80) = 4.62; ptwo-tailed < 0.04).  The ANOVA shows that auditors are more 
comfortable with the evidence when there is less Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 5.62, ptwo-tailed = 
0.04); however, inconsistent with auditor comfort there is no interaction affect of Support 
and Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 0.40, ptwo-tailed = 0.53). 
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Comfort_Evidence 
 Participants responded to the question “How comfortable are you with the amount of 
available audit evidence pertaining to the warranty accrual?” (0=Not Very Comfortable, 
5=Average Degree of Comfort, 10=Very Comfortable).  I measure the auditor’ comfort with 
the evidence to measure the extent to which the auditor’s overall perception of the evidence 
is driving auditor comfort.  Consistent with my manipulation, participants indicated that they 
were more comfortable in the More condition (mean = 3.9) than the Less condition (mean = 
3.1) (F(1,80) = 4.04; ptwo-tailed < 0.05).  The ANOVA shows that auditors are more 
comfortable with the evidence when there is less Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 5.48, ptwo-tailed = 
0.02), but there is no interaction affect of Support and Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 1.49, ptwo-tailed 
= 0.23). 
Avail_Evidence 
 Participants responded to the question “How much evidence is available to support 
the warranty accrual adjustment?” (0=Minimal Evidence, 5=Average Evidence, 
10=Extensive Evidence).  I measure the auditor’ perception of the amount of the evidence to 
measure the extent to which the auditor’s perception of the quantity of evidence is driving 
auditor comfort.  Consistent with my manipulation, participants indicated that there was 
more support in the More condition (mean = 4.4) than the Less condition (mean = 3.0) 
(F(1,80) = 13.91; ptwo-tailed < 0.01), and this holds for both levels of estimate uncertainty 
(moderate, F(1,42) = 6.36; ptwo-tailed = 0.02; extreme, F(1,38) = 7.45; ptwo-tailed = 0.01).  The 
ANOVA shows that auditors perceive more evidence when there is less Uncertainty 
(F(1,80) = 3.69, ptwo-tailed = 0.06), but there is no interaction effect of Support and 
Uncertainty (F(1,80) = 0.14, ptwo-tailed = 0.71). 
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3. Context Check and Other Variables 
 I collect a series of context checks and other variables that could interact or affect my 
primary variables of interest.  Table B3 of this appendix tabulates descriptive statistics and 
basic ANOVA results for other variables collected during the experiment.  
Dem_Partner, Dem_Mgt, Dem_Reviewer 
 Participants responded to the question “How difficult would it be for you to 
demonstrate to the following parties that the estimate you provided in question #1 on the 
previous page should be recorded in the financial statements?” (Partner on the engagement, 
ANS management, Audit quality reviewer (i.e. PCAOB)) (0=Not Very Difficult, 5=Average 
Difficulty, 10=Very Difficult).  I captured several accountability variables because 
accountability can create perverse incentives that alter judgments from what would 
otherwise be considered normative (Learner and Tetlock 1999).  Specifically, I measure the 
extent to which auditors felt they could defend their adjustment to the (1) engagement 
partner, (2) management, and (3) a quality reviewer. ANOVA results controlling for the 
accountability measures does not significantly alter the results reported in the paper.  The 
interaction affect of uncertainty and support on auditor comfort remains significant when 
controlling for each accountability measure (partner: F(1,79) = 6.98; pone-tailed < 0.01; 
management: F(1,79) = 5.91; pone-tailed = 0.01; reviewer: F(1,79) = 5.85; pone-tailed = 0.01).  
Similarly, the interaction affect of uncertainty and support on auditors expected adjustment 
remains significant when controlling for each accountability measure (partner: F(1,79) = 
8.17; pone-tailed < 0.01; management: F(1,79) = 5.52; pone-tailed = 0.01; reviewer: F(1,79) = 
7.97; pone-tailed < 0.01).  Overall, my results are robust to controlling for auditor 
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accountability to key constituencies, further supporting the theory that auditor judgments are 
being driven by the extent of systematic reasoning. 
Predictable 
 Participants responded to the question “How predictable is the controller’s response 
to your evaluation of the warranty adjustment?” (0=Not Very Predictable, 5=Average 
Predictability, 10=Very Predictable).  I measure the predictability of the controller’s actions 
as differences in predictability could influence auditor perceptions of the overall uncertainty 
and also their comfort with management’s estimate (Berger 2005).  Controlling for the 
predictability of management does not significantly alter the results of H1 (interaction of 
uncertainty and support on auditor comfort F(1,79) = 7.42; pone-tailed < 0.01), or interaction of 
uncertainty and support on expected adjustment (F(1,79) = 5.95; pone-tailed = 0.01).   
Knowledge 
 Participants responded to the question “Based on the information provided, how 
would you rate the controller’s technical accounting knowledge?” (0=Very Weak 
Knowledge, 5=Average Knowledge, 10=Very Strong Knowledge).  there was no significant 
difference in perceptions of management knowledge between conditions (i.e. all ptwo-tailed ≥ 
0.17), and controlling for knowledge does not significantly alter the interaction of Support 
and Uncertainty on auditor comfort (F(1,80) = 6.84, pone-tailed < 0.01). 
Material 
 Participants responded to the question “Is the warranty accrual adjustment decision 
material to ANS’s financial statements?” (0=Not Very Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 
10=Very Likely).  I measure the materiality of the estimate to ensure that auditor comfort is 
not driven by the estimate being not material in some of my conditions.  Participants 
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believed the adjustment was material (0=Not Very Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very 
Likely; mean=8.2), and there was no significant difference in materiality evaluations 
between conditions (i.e. all ptwo-tailed ≥ 0.34). 
User_Assur  
 Participants responded to the question “What level of assurance are you able to 
provide over the warranty accrual to users of the financial statements?” (0=Low Assurance, 
5=Reasonable Assurance, 10=Almost Absolute Assurance).  I measure the level of assurance 
auditors perceive they provide to contribute to the ongoing discussion of auditors disclosing 
the level of assurance for financial statement items.  Measuring this also contributes to the 
auditor comfort literature by directly tying auditor’s perception of the level of assurance to 
auditor comfort.  I discuss the results of the level of assurance auditor perceive they provide 
to users of the financial statements in Chapter 4.3, and tabulate results in Table 3. 
Investor_Assur 
 Participants responded to the question “What level of assurance do you believe 
investors perceive that you provide over the warranty accrual?” (0=Low Assurance, 
5=Reasonable Assurance, 10=Almost Absolute Assurance).  I measure the auditor’s 
perception of the level of assurance presumed by investors to measure the extent to which 
auditors anticipate users perceptions of levels of assurance.  This measure, when compared 
to the level of assurance that auditors believe they provide, seeks to capture some aspect of 
the expectations gap.  Somewhat interestingly, I find no significant affect of either the level 
of uncertainty or the degree of management evidentiary support on auditor perception of the 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Reasonable = Based on the information provided, is it more likely that management’s adjustment to the 
warranty accrual of $7,507,500 is reasonable or not reasonable? (1=Reasonable, 0=Right on the 
border between Reasonable and Unreasonable, -1=Not Reasonable) 
Reasonableness = Rate the overall reasonableness of management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty 
accrual? (11-point scale, -5=Not at all Reasonable, 0=Just Meets Reasonableness Threshold 5=Very 
Reasonable) 
Comfort = How comfortable are you with management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual? (11-point scale, -
5=Very Uncomfortable, 0=As Comfortable As Not, 5=Very Comfortable) 
Likely = How likely are you to propose an audit adjustment to the warranty accrual? (11-point scale, 0=Not 
Very Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very Likely)  
RMM = How would you assess the risk of material misstatement of the warranty accrual? (11-point scale, 
0=Low Risk, 2.5=Somewhat Below Average, 5=Average Risk, 7.5= 
Most = What adjustment to the warranty accrual do you believe is most reasonable for ANS to record in the 
financial statements? 
Lowest and Highest = What range of adjustments to the warranty accrual would you accept as reasonable for 
ANS to record in the financial statements? (Lowest Reasonable Adjustment, Highest Reasonable 
Adjustment) 
Expected Adjustment = What adjustment to the warranty accrual do you believe will most likely be recorded in 
the financial statements? 
Different = How likely is it that the final repair cost of the incorrect router installations will turn out to be 
materially different than the warranty accrual adjustment that you indicated was the ‘most reasonable 
adjustment’? (11-point scale, 0=Not Very Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very Likely) 
Additional work = How much additional test work do you anticipate you would need to complete to be 
comfortable with the warranty accrual? (11-point scale, 0=Minimal additional work, 5=Average 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variable Definitions       
Aggressive = How would you characterize management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual? (11-point scale, 
0=Conservative, 5=Neutral/Balanced, 10=Aggressive) 
Appropriate = How appropriate was management’s analysis of the warranty issue? (11-point scale, -5=Very 
Inappropriate, 0=As Appropriate As Not, 5=Very Appropriate) 
Confident = How confident are you of your assessment of a material misstatement of the warranty accrual? 
(11-point scale, 0=Not Very Confident, 5=Reasonably Confident, 10=Very Confident) 
Adequate = How adequate is the available audit evidence on which you can base your opinion pertaining to the 
warranty accrual? (11-point scale, 0=Not Very Adequate, 5=Average Adequacy, 10=Very Adequate) 
Comfort_Evidence = How comfortable are you with the amount of available audit evidence pertaining to the 
warranty accrual? (11-point scale, 0=Not Very Comfortable, 5=Average Degree of Comfort, 10=Very 
Comfortable) 
Avail_Evidence = How much evidence is available to support the warranty accrual adjustment? (11-point 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Variable Definitions         
Dem_Partner, Dem_Mgt, Dem_Reviewer = How difficult would it be for you to demonstrate to the following 
parties that the estimate you provided in question #1 on the previous page should be recorded in the 
financial statements? (Partner on the engagement, ANS management, Audit quality reviewer (i.e. 
PCAOB)) (11-point scale, 0=Not Very Difficult, 5=Average Difficulty, 10=Very Difficult) 
Predictable = How predictable is the controller’s response to your evaluation of the warranty adjustment? (11-
point scale, 0=Not Very Predictable, 5=Average Predictability, 10=Very Predictable) 
Knowledge = Based on the information provided, how would you rate the controller’s technical accounting 
knowledge? (11-point scale, 0=Very Weak Knowledge, 5=Average Knowledge, 10=Very Strong 
Knowledge) 
Material = Is the warranty accrual adjustment decision material to ANS’s financial statements? (11-point scale, 
0=Not Very Likely, 5=As Likely As Not, 10=Very Likely) 
User_Assur = What level of assurance are you able to provide over the warranty accrual to users of the financial 
statements? (11-point scale, 0=Low Assurance, 5=Reasonable Assurance, 10=Almost Absolute 
Assurance) 
Investor_Assur = What level of assurance do you believe investors perceive that you provide over the warranty 
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Graphical Representation of Prediction 
 




This figure depicts a graphical representation of my context.  The x-axis represents the level of uncertainty and 
the y-axis represents the degree of management’s evidential support.  The diagonal dotted line represents the 
auditor’s expectation; as estimate uncertainty increases, the auditor expects higher degrees of evidential support. 
The upper solid line and lower dashed line represent more and less evidential support provided by management, 
respectively.   
 
  






















Figure 1 (cont.) 
Graphical Representation of Prediction 
 
Panel B, Graphical representation of theoretical predictions 
 
    
 
This figure depicts a graphical representation of my context and theoretical predication.  The x-axis represents 
the level of uncertainty and the y-axis represents the degree of management’s evidential support.  The diagonal 
dotted line represents the auditor’s expectation; as estimate uncertainty increases, the auditor expects higher 
degrees of evidential support. The upper solid line and lower dashed line represent more and less evidential 
support provided by management, respectively.   
 
My theory predicts that points along the auditor’s expectation line elicit lower systematic processing than points 
not on the expectation line.  The diamonds represent the points where management’s evidentiary support and 
auditor expectations for support, given the level of uncertainty, are aligned.  The square represents misalignment 
by seemingly ‘too much’ evidential support given the level of estimate uncertainty; whereas, the circle represents 
misalignment by seemingly ‘too little’ evidential support.  The arrows between the diamonds and the square or 
circle (depending on condition) represent misalignment, and thus the extent of auditor discomfort. 
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Figure 2 
Results of H1 




The dependent variable, auditor comfort, is the average of two questions pertaining to management’s warranty 
accrual: (1) “Rate the overall reasonableness of management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty accrual?” 
and (2) “How comfortable are you with management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual?” 
 
Support is manipulated by varying the support management provides for their estimate.  In the More condition 
the estimate is based on industry information, inquiry of technicians, review of records, and site inspections, 
while in the Less condition the estimate is based on only industry information and inquiry. 
 
Uncertainty is manipulated by providing information about potential costs to resolve the warranty issue that 
revealed either Moderate uncertainty (between $6.3 million and $8.8 million) or Extreme uncertainty (between 


























Results of H2 




This figure presents results of a mediation analysis using Baron and Kenny’s four-step process (Baron and 
Kenny 1986). 
My primary independent variable is the interaction of management’s evidentiary support (Support) and the level 
of estimate uncertainty (Uncertainty).  Support is manipulated by varying the support management provides for 
their estimate, either More or Less.  In the More condition, the estimate is based on industry information, inquiry 
of technicians, review of records, and site inspections, while in the Less condition the estimate is based on only 
industry information and inquiry.  Uncertainty is manipulated by providing information about potential costs to 
resolve the warranty issue that reveals either Moderate uncertainty (between $6.3 million and $8.8 million) or 
Extreme uncertainty (between $2.9 million and $13.4 million). 
 
The dependent variable, Expected Adjustment, is participants’ response to the following question (in thousands) 
“What adjustment to the warranty accrual do you believe will most likely be recorded in the financial 
statements?” 
 
Auditor comfort is the average of two questions designed to illicit participant’s overall comfort with 
management’s warranty accrual.  The two questions were (1) “Rate the overall reasonableness of management’s 
$7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty accrual?” and (2) “How comfortable are you with management’s 







H1: Auditor Comfort 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for auditor comfort with management's estimate 
           
    Support     













-1.37  -0.12  -0.72   
Standard Deviation 
 
1.80  1.94  1.95   
Sample size 
 
19  21  40    
 
 







1.01  0.03  0.52   
Standard Deviation 
 
1.52  2.17  1.91   
Sample size 
 











-0.09  -0.05  -0.07    
Standard Deviation 
 
2.02  2.03  2.02    
Sample size 
 
41  43  84   
           
Panel B: ANOVA results         
           
Factor   df  MS  F  p-value 
Support   1  0.37  0.11  0.37 
Uncertainty  1  33.45  9.55  <0.01 
Support*Uncertainty  1  25.83  7.38  <0.01 
Residual   80  3.50     
           
Panel C: Contrast test results        
           
Contrast  df  F  p-value   
Support, Uncertainty=Extreme 1  4.41  0.02   
Support, Uncertainty=Moderate 1  3.13  0.04   
 
This table presents descriptive statistics, basic ANOVA, and follow-up simple effect test results for auditor 
comfort.  All p-values are one-tailed. 
The dependent variable, auditor comfort, is the average of two questions designed to illicit participant’s overall 
comfort with management’s warranty accrual (both on an 11-point scale).  The two questions were (1) “Rate the 
overall reasonableness of management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty accrual?” and (2) “How 
comfortable are you with management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual?” 
 
Support is manipulated by varying the support management provides for their estimate.  In the More condition, 
the estimate is based on industry information, inquiry of technicians, review of records, and site inspections, 
while in the Less condition the estimate is based on only industry information and inquiry. 
 
Uncertainty is manipulated by providing information about potential costs to resolve the warranty issue that 
revealed either Moderate uncertainty (between $6.3 million and $8.8 million) or Extreme uncertainty (between 






Panel A: Descriptive statistics for auditor's expected adjustment to management's estimate 
           
    Support     












1,596  772  1,163   
Standard Deviation 
 
1,398  1,264  1,376   
Sample size 
 
19  21  40    
 
 







387  860  623   
Standard Deviation 
 
749  1,202  1,018   
Sample size 
 
22  22  44    
 
 






947  817  880    
Standard Deviation 
 
1,244  1,218  1,225    
Sample size 
 
41  43  84   
           
Panel B: ANOVA results         
           
Factor   df  MS  F  p-value 
Support   1  640,725  0.47  0.25 
Uncertainty  1  6,572,919  4.81  0.02 
Support*Uncertainty  1  8,803,963  6.45  0.01 
Residual   80  1,365,424     
           
Panel C: Contrast test results       
           
Contrast  df  F  p-value   
Support, Uncertainty=Extreme 1  4.96  0.01   
Support, Uncertainty=Moderate 1  1.81  0.09   
 
This table presents descriptive statistics, basic ANOVA, and follow-up simple effect test results for auditor’s 
expected adjustment.  All p-values are one-tailed. 
The dependent variable, Expected Adjustment, is participants’ response to the following question (in thousands) 
“What adjustment to the warranty accrual do you believe will most likely be recorded in the financial 
statements?”  Responses were adjusted for management’s proposed estimate of $7,507,500 and thus indicate the 
auditor’s expected adjustment on top of management’s estimate. 
 
Support is manipulated by varying the support management provides for their estimate.  In the More condition, 
the estimate is based on industry information, inquiry of technicians, review of records, and site inspections, 
while in the Less condition the estimate is based on only industry information and inquiry. 
 
Uncertainty is manipulated by providing information about potential costs to resolve the warranty issue that 
revealed either Moderate uncertainty (between $6.3 million and $8.8 million) or Extreme uncertainty (between 




Assurance Provided to Users of the Financial Statements 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for auditor assessment of assurance provided 
           
    Evidence     













3.62  4.38  4.01   
Standard Deviation 
 
1.85  1.90  1.88   
Sample size 
 
19  21  40    
 
 








4.99  4.42  4.71   
Standard Deviation 
 
1.85  1.90  1.88   
Sample size 
 
22  22  44    
 
 






4.35  4.40  8.75    
Standard Deviation 
 
1.89  1.93  1.87    
Sample size 
 
41  43  84   
           
Panel B: ANCOVA results         
           
Factor   df  MS  F  p-value 
Preliminary RMM  1  11.311  3.31  0.07 
Evidence  1  0.193  0.06  0.41 
Uncertainty  1  10.011  2.93  0.05 
Evidence*Uncertainty  1  8.768  2.57  0.06 
Residual  77  3.415     
           
 
This table presents descriptive statistics and basic ANCOVA results for auditor’s perception of the level of 
assurance provided to users of the financial statements.  All p-values are one-tailed. 
The dependent variable, user assurance, is participants’ response to the following question (on an 11-point scale) 
“What level of assurance are you able to provide over the warranty accrual to users of the financial statements?” 
 
Preliminary RMM is participant’s response to the following questions (on an 11-point scale) before they were 
provided managements analysis or exposed to any manipulations “For planning the year-end test work, how 
would you assess the risk of material misstatement of the Warranty Accrual?” 
 
Support is manipulated by varying the support management provides for their estimate.  In the More condition, 
the estimate is based on industry information, inquiry of technicians, review of records, and site inspections, 
while in the Less condition the estimate is based on only industry information and inquiry. 
 
Uncertainty is manipulated by providing information about potential costs to resolve the warranty issue that 
revealed either Moderate uncertainty (between $6.3 million and $8.8 million) or Extreme uncertainty (between 
$2.9 million and $13.4 million). 
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Table 4 
Robustness Test for Auditor Comfort 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics for auditor's comfort with management's estimate   
  Pairwise  Listwise 














Extreme/More        
 Mean -0.27 -0.27 -0.24  -0.16 -0.16 -0.12 
 Standard Deviation 1.89 25.00 1.93  1.90 1.90 1.94 
 Sample size 25 25 24  22 22 21 
Extreme/Less        
 Mean -1.54 -1.54 -1.42  -1.49 -1.49 -1.37 
 Standard Deviation 1.72 1.72 1.77  1.75 1.75 1.80 
 Sample size 22 22 20  21 21 19 
Moderate/More        
 Mean -0.14 -0.14 -0.14  0.03 0.03 0.03 
 Standard Deviation 2.16 2.16 2.16  2.17 2.17 2.17 
 Sample size 24 24 24  22 22 22 
Moderate/Less        
 Mean 0.71 0.75 0.75  0.96 1.01 1.01 
 Standard Deviation 1.90 1.94 1.94  1.50 1.52 1.52 
 Sample size 24 23 23  23 22 22 
Total        
 Mean -0.28 -0.29 -0.23  -0.14 -0.14 -0.07 
 Standard Deviation 2.06 2.07 2.07  2.01 2.02 2.02 
 Sample size 95 94 91  88 87 84 
         
Panel B: ANOVA results       
  Pairwise  Listwise 














Support        
 p-value 0.30 0.32 0.36  0.31 0.33 0.37 
 std. error 0.40 0.40 0.41  0.39 0.40 0.41 
 F 0.3 0.2 0.1  0.3 0.2 0.1 
Uncertainty        
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 std. error 0.40 0.40 0.41  0.39 0.40 0.41 
 F 9.0 9.1 7.6  11.4 11.5 9.5 
Support*Uncertainty        
 p-value 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 0.00 
 std. error 0.20 0.20 0.21  0.20 0.20 0.21 
 F 7.2 7.2 6.3  8.3 8.5 7.4 
Residual        
 std. error 0.34 0.34 0.35  0.34 0.34 0.35 
 F 5.7 5.7 4.7  4.6 4.7 3.7 
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Table 4 (cont.) 
Robustness Test for Auditor Comfort 
 
Panel C: Contrast test results       
  Pairwise  Listwise 














Support, Uncertainty=Extreme       
 p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02  0.01 0.01 0.02 
 F 5.1 5.0 4.0  5.6 5.6 4.4 
Support, Uncertainty=Moderate       
 p-value 0.06 0.06 0.06  0.05 0.04 0.04 
 F 2.4 2.5 2.4  2.9 3.1 3.0 
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics, basic ANOVA, and follow-up simple effect test results for auditor comfort 
with different filters applied to observations.  Pairwise includes all observations with completed comfort 
variables, while listwise includes only observations with completed comfort and expected adjustment variables.  
Column A and D present results for all observations.  Column B and E present results after dropping one 
observation due to evidence of inattentiveness during the experiment, based the same response to 20 consecutive 
variables.  Column C and F present results after dropping the one inattentive observation and dropping three 
observations because of perceptions that managements estimate was overly conservative while my hypotheses 
rely on management’s estimate being perceived as reasonable or aggressive.   All p-values are one-tailed. 
The dependent variable, auditor comfort, is the average of two questions designed to illicit participant’s overall 
comfort with management’s warranty accrual (both on an 11-point scale).  The two questions were (1) “Rate the 
overall reasonableness of management’s $7,507,500 adjustment to the warranty accrual?” and (2) “How 
comfortable are you with management’s adjustment to the warranty accrual?” 
 
Support is manipulated by varying the support management provides for their estimate.  In the More condition, 
the estimate is based on industry information, inquiry of technicians, review of records, and site inspections, 
while in the Less condition the estimate is based on only industry information and inquiry. 
 
Uncertainty is manipulated by providing information about potential costs to resolve the warranty issue that 
revealed either Moderate uncertainty (between $6.3 million and $8.8 million) or Extreme uncertainty (between 
$2.9 million and $13.4 million). 
 
